Ledger & Candle
Chapter 08 · Fundamental Analysis

Valuation

Reading time ~70 min · Data as of 30 Sep 2026 · Based on Zerodha Varsity Module 3 (Fundamental Analysis) ch. 11, 13–16 and Module 13 (Integrated Financial Modelling) ch. 14–18

1. What you'll learn and why it matters

Chapters 6 and 7 taught you to judge whether a business is good. This chapter answers the next question: is the stock worth what the market is asking for it? A wonderful company bought at a silly price can still lose you money for years. You will meet a real case below: Asian Paints in January 2022.

By the end of this chapter you will be able to:

Why this matters for each style in this course

Long-term investor: valuation decides your returns as much as business quality does. Overpay and you can earn nothing for years even while the company grows.

Swing trader: you will not run a DCF for a three-week trade. But knowing that a stock trades at 80x earnings tells you how hard it can fall on a small earnings miss, and an index P/E at the bottom of its range tells you something about the backdrop for your trades.

Futures trader: leverage magnifies valuation risk. A richly valued stock can gap down 10–15% on results day, and with futures you feel that several times over. Valuation context tells you where the air pockets are.

The main real examples in this chapter: a full DCF of Pidilite Industries; reverse DCFs of Asian Paints and ITC (plus Pidilite); a dividend discount model of ITC; P/E bands of Pidilite, Asian Paints, ITC and TCS; the cyclical P/E trap at Tata Steel; P/B for five large banks; EV/EBITDA across paints, metals and cement; and the Nifty 50's own valuation. Financials are consolidated, from screener.in pages fetched on 2 Oct 2026 (FY26 annual results plus the June-2026 quarter). Prices are NSE closes on 30 Sep 2026.

Educational, not advice

Every valuation in this chapter is a worked example built on stated assumptions. Change an assumption and the answer changes, sometimes a lot. Nothing here is a recommendation to buy or sell any security. Equity investing can lose money, and leveraged products can lose more than you put in.

2. Price is not value

Price is what you pay: the last traded number on the screen. It changes every second and reflects the mood, flows and news of the moment. Value (also called intrinsic value or fair value) is what the business is worth to an owner, based on the cash it is expected to produce over its life. Value changes slowly, as the business itself changes.

Varsity puts it simply: an investment works best when a great business is bought at a great price, and even a mediocre business can be a good investment if the price is low enough. Valuation is the third stage of equity research. Stage one asks whether you understand and like the business, stage two checks its financial performance (chapters 6–7), and stage three asks whether the price makes sense.

Asian Paints price from 2016 to 2026 compared with a step line equal to median P/E times trailing EPS; in 2021-2022 price is far above the line
Asian Paints: price (black) vs a simple earnings-based value estimate, the stock's own median P/E of 67x times trailing EPS (blue). Source: NSE prices via Yahoo Finance, EPS from screener.in.
Real example · ASIANPAINT · Jan 2022 → Sep 2026

A great company, an expensive price

  1. On 7 Jan 2022 Asian Paints closed at ₹3,576.3. Its trailing P/E was 109.3x, well above its own 10-year median of about 67x.
  2. The business kept growing. EPS went from ₹31.59 (FY22) to ₹45.09 (FY26), up 42.7%.
  3. The stock did not follow. On 30 Sep 2026 it closed at ₹2,402.6, down 32.8% from that January 2022 close.
  4. The gap came from the multiple: the P/E fell from 109x to about 48x. The business did fine. The buyer in January 2022 overpaid.

Valuation methods try to estimate value so you can compare it with price:

Think in ranges

Every value estimate rests on assumptions about the future. Varsity suggests treating your DCF output as a band of ±10% (a "modelling error" band) instead of one exact number, and buying only when the price is comfortably below that band. We will do exactly that for Pidilite.

3. Time value of money: PV, FV and NPV

₹100 today is worth more than ₹100 a year from now, for two reasons: you could invest today's ₹100 and earn a return (opportunity cost), and future money is uncertain. So money received at different times cannot be added up directly. It first has to be moved to the same point in time.

Formula — future value and present value \[ FV = PV \times (1+r)^{n} \qquad\qquad PV = \frac{FV}{(1+r)^{n}} \]
\(PV\)
Present value: what the money is worth today, in ₹.
\(FV\)
Future value: what the money will be worth (or the amount you will receive) at the end of \(n\) periods, in ₹.
\(r\)
The rate per period, written as a decimal (7.18% = 0.0718). It is your opportunity cost, the return you could earn elsewhere, also called the "discount rate". In this chapter a period is one year, so \(r\) is a yearly rate.
\(n\)
The number of periods (here, years) between today and the future date.
\((1+r)^{n}\)
The small raised \(n\) is an exponent: multiply \((1+r)\) by itself \(n\) times. \(1.0718^{5} = 1.0718 \times 1.0718 \times 1.0718 \times 1.0718 \times 1.0718\).

How it works: each year the money grows by the factor \((1+r)\), so after \(n\) years it has grown by \((1+r)^{n}\). Compounding multiplies by that factor to go forward in time. Discounting divides by it to come back to today. The bigger \(r\) or \(n\), the smaller today's value of a future rupee.

Worked example · rates as of 30 Sep 2026

Moving money through time

Use the 10-year Government of India bond (G-sec) yield on 30 Sep 2026, 7.18%, as a nearly risk-free rate.

  1. FV: ₹10,000 invested for 5 years at 7.18%: \(10{,}000 \times 1.0718^{5} = ₹14{,}143.89\).
  2. PV: ₹1,00,000 promised in 10 years, with a required return of 12% (a typical equity hurdle): \(1{,}00{,}000 / 1.12^{10} = ₹32{,}197.32\). The promise is worth less than a third of its face value today.
  3. Check: ₹100 due in 10 years is worth about ₹50 today at 7.18%, but only ₹24.7 at 15%. A higher discount rate means a lower present value.
Three curves showing the present value of 100 rupees received in 0 to 30 years at 7.18, 12 and 15 percent discount rates
The present value of ₹100 falls faster the further away it is and the higher the discount rate. This one picture explains most of valuation.

Net present value (NPV)

When an asset produces a stream of cash flows, discount each one separately and add them up. That sum is the net present value. It is the most you should rationally pay today for that stream.

Formula — NPV of a stream of cash flows \[ NPV = \sum_{t=1}^{n} \frac{CF_t}{(1+r)^{t}} \]
\(\Sigma\)
"Sigma" means add up: work out the fraction for \(t = 1\), then \(t = 2\), and so on up to \(t = n\), and add the results.
\(t\)
The year a cash flow arrives: 1 for one year from today, 2 for two years, and so on.
\(CF_t\)
The cash flow received in year \(t\), in ₹.
\(n\)
The last year in which a cash flow arrives.
\(r\)
The yearly discount rate, as a decimal (as in the formula above).
\(NPV\)
Net present value: the whole stream of cash flows expressed as one amount in today's ₹.
  1. Take each year's cash flow and divide it by \((1+r)^{t}\). This is the present-value formula above, applied once per year.
  2. Later cash flows are divided by a bigger number, so they count for less.
  3. Add up all the present values. The total is the most you should pay today for the whole stream.
Worked example · Varsity's pizza-machine idea, at today's rate

What is a machine worth if it earns ₹5 lakh a year for 10 years?

Varsity's DCF primer uses a pizza machine that earns ₹5,00,000 a year for 10 years and is then worthless. We re-run it with the current G-sec yield of 7.18% as the opportunity cost.

  1. Total cash over 10 years: \(10 \times 5{,}00{,}000 = ₹50{,}00{,}000\). You should never pay more than this.
  2. PV of year 1's cash: \(5{,}00{,}000/1.0718 = ₹4{,}66{,}505\). PV of year 10's cash: \(5{,}00{,}000/1.0718^{10} = ₹2{,}49{,}938\).
  3. Sum of all ten PVs = NPV = ₹34,82,756. That is the most a buyer earning 7.18% elsewhere should pay. A lower price is a good deal, a price at NPV is a fair deal, and a higher price is a bad deal.

Replace the machine with a company and its cash flows with free cash flow, and you have a DCF.

4. Three ways to value a business

Varsity's financial-modelling module groups valuation methods into three families:

FamilyIdeaTypical toolsBest for
Relative (comparables)Similar businesses should sell at similar multiplesP/E, P/S, P/B, EV/EBITDA, PEGQuick checks, peer comparison, your stock's own history
Absolute (intrinsic)Value = PV of future cash flowsDCF on FCFF or FCFE, dividend discount modelStable, cash-generating businesses you understand
Option-basedValue depends on whether some event happensOption-pricing logic (covered in options chapters)Early-stage firms, R&D bets, mining or biotech outcomes

Relative valuation is intuitive but has two weaknesses that Varsity points out. The whole sector can be mispriced (think of the dot-com bubble), and no two companies are truly identical. A firm with a 25% profit margin deserves a higher P/S than one with 15%. Absolute valuation forces you to write down every assumption, which is its strength, but the output is only as good as those assumptions.

Enterprise value vs equity value

Rearranging the balance sheet makes the two viewpoints clear. Assets = debt + equity. Split the assets into cash and operating assets and move cash to the other side:

Balance sheet, re-ordered \[ \text{Operating assets} = (\text{Debt} - \text{Cash}) + \text{Equity} = \text{Net debt} + \text{Equity} \]
Operating assets
Everything the business uses to run itself (plants, brands, inventory, receivables), i.e. all assets except surplus cash and investments. In ₹ crore.
Debt
Money owed to lenders: borrowings, including lease liabilities. In ₹ crore.
Cash
Cash, bank balances and surplus investments the business does not need to operate. In ₹ crore.
Net debt
Debt minus cash. If cash is larger than debt, net debt is negative and the company has net cash.
Equity
The shareholders' claim on the business.

How it works: the operating business is financed partly by lenders (net of the cash they could be repaid from) and partly by shareholders. So if you know the value of the whole operating business (enterprise value), you get the shareholders' part by subtracting net debt, or by adding net cash.

Example (from the Pidilite DCF in Section 8, ₹ crore): enterprise value 38,191 and net cash 4,232 (net debt of −4,232), so equity value = 38,191 + 4,232 = 42,423.

5. Free cash flow: FCF, FCFF and FCFE

A business is worth the cash it can hand back to its owners. Profit is an accounting opinion; cash is a fact (chapter 6). The cash flow we discount is free cash flow: what is left after the company has paid its running costs and taxes and reinvested enough in fixed assets and working capital to keep growing.

Formula — three versions of free cash flow \[ \text{FCF (simple)} = \text{Cash from operations} - \text{Capex} \] \[ \text{FCFF} = \text{EBIT}\,(1-t) + \text{D\&A} - \Delta\text{Working capital} - \text{Capex} \] \[ \text{FCFE} = \text{FCFF} - \text{Interest}\,(1-t) + \text{Net borrowing} \]
Cash from operations
(CFO) The operating cash flow line of the cash flow statement: cash the business actually collected from running itself in the year, in ₹ crore.
Capex
Capital expenditure: money spent in the year on fixed assets (plants, machinery, stores), net of assets sold. From the investing section of the cash flow statement.
FCFF
Free cash flow to the firm: cash left for all providers of capital, lenders and shareholders together, after running costs, tax and reinvestment.
FCFE
Free cash flow to equity: cash left for shareholders only, after lenders have been paid interest and after any new borrowing or repayment.
EBIT
Earnings before interest and tax: operating profit after depreciation. EBITDA is the same figure before depreciation and amortisation as well.
\(t\)
The company's tax rate, as a decimal (26% = 0.26).
D&A
Depreciation and amortisation for the year: a non-cash accounting charge, added back.
\(\Delta\)Working capital
The Greek letter \(\Delta\) ("delta") means "change in". This is the increase in working capital (inventory + receivables − payables) over the year. An increase ties up cash, so it is subtracted. A decrease releases cash, so subtracting a negative number adds it back.
Interest
Interest paid to lenders in the year. Multiplying by \((1-t)\) gives its after-tax cost, because interest reduces the tax bill.
Net borrowing
New loans taken minus loans repaid during the year. Positive if debt went up.
  1. Simple FCF is the quick version: take operating cash flow straight from the cash flow statement and subtract capex.
  2. FCFF builds the same idea from the profit and loss account: after-tax operating profit, plus the non-cash D&A, minus cash tied up in working capital, minus capex. Discount it at WACC to get enterprise value.
  3. FCFE starts from FCFF, takes off what lenders received (after-tax interest) and adds any net new borrowing. Discount it at the cost of equity to get equity value.

The logic behind each piece:

The tax shield

Interest is tax-deductible, so debt reduces a company's tax bill. Varsity's example: EBIT ₹700 cr, interest ₹70 cr, tax 25%. With the interest, tax is ₹157.5 cr. Without it, tax would be ₹175 cr. The ₹17.5 cr saved is the tax shield, and it is why the after-tax cost of debt is \(K_d(1-t)\). If you start from PAT instead of EBIT, add back interest × (1 − t), not the full interest. Both routes give the same FCFF.

Real example · PIDILITIND · FY26 (consolidated, ₹ crore)

Pidilite's free cash flow to the firm, line by line

  1. Operating profit (EBITDA, excluding other income) = 3,521; depreciation = 395. So EBIT = 3,521 − 395 = 3,126.
  2. Tax rate FY26 = 26%. NOPAT = 3,126 × (1 − 0.26) = 2,313.2.
  3. Add back D&A: 2,313.2 + 395 = 2,708.2.
  4. Capex (fixed assets purchased 593, minus assets sold 4) = 589. Working capital absorbed 51 (from the cash flow statement).
  5. FCFF = 2,708.2 − 589 − 51 = ₹2,068.2 cr. For comparison, the simple version, CFO − capex = 2,828 − 589 = ₹2,239 cr.

Why exclude "other income" (₹248 cr in FY26)? It is mostly interest and gains on Pidilite's ₹4,350 cr of treasury investments. We will add those investments to the valuation separately at the end. Counting both their income and their balance would double count them.

Bar chart of Pidilite NOPAT, capex and FCFF for FY16 to FY26, with a working capital line; FY24 FCFF is boosted by an inventory release
Pidilite's FCFF build-up, FY16–FY26. Note FY24: working capital released ₹574 cr, which flattered that year's FCFF. That is why we average three years. Source: screener.in consolidated statements.
Pick a normal starting point

FCFF swings with working capital. Pidilite's last three years were ₹2,089.9 cr (FY24, helped by an inventory release), ₹1,672.2 cr (FY25) and ₹2,068.2 cr (FY26). Following Varsity, we use the three-year average, ₹1,943.5 cr, as the base year so one unusual year does not drive the whole valuation. Also watch acquisitions: in FY21 Pidilite spent about ₹2,061 cr in "other investing items" (largely buying a business). Growth bought this way is not free cash flow. A DCF that ignores acquisition spending overstates FCF for serial acquirers.

6. The discount rate: CAPM, beta and WACC

The discount rate is the return investors require for the risk they take. Lenders take less risk and accept a lower return. Shareholders are paid last and demand more.

6.1 Cost of equity with CAPM

Formula — Capital Asset Pricing Model \[ K_e = R_f + \beta \times \text{ERP}, \qquad \text{ERP} = R_m - R_f \]
\(K_e\)
Cost of equity: the yearly return shareholders require for holding this stock, in %.
\(R_f\)
The risk-free rate: the yearly return on a nearly riskless investment. We use the 10-year G-sec yield (7.18% on 30 Sep 2026).
\(\beta\)
Beta: how strongly the stock tends to move with the market. 1 = in line with the market, below 1 = less, above 1 = more. Computed from past returns (formula below).
\(R_m\)
The expected yearly return on the whole stock market, in %.
ERP
The equity risk premium, \(R_m - R_f\): the extra yearly return investors want for owning shares instead of government bonds. We use 7.0%.

How it works: start from what a riskless bond pays, then add a reward for risk. The reward is the market's risk premium scaled by beta, so a stock that swings more than the market must offer a higher expected return. The result, \(K_e\), is the discount rate for equity cash flows.

Risk-free rate. Varsity uses the 10-year G-sec yield as the proxy. On 30 Sep 2026 it was 7.18% (countryeconomy.com; Trading Economics shows 7.16%). It rose from 6.96% at the start of September 2026. We use \(R_f = 7.18\%\).

Equity risk premium. This is the extra return investors want for owning stocks instead of government bonds. Professor Aswath Damodaran's January 2026 update puts India's total ERP at 7.08%, and Indian valuation firm Incwert recommends 7.0% (range 6.5–7.5%) from January 2026. We use ERP = 7.0%. Varsity's older chapters instead assume a market return \(R_m\) of 8.5–12%. Either way, write the number down and justify it.

Beta. Beta measures how much a stock tends to move when the market moves. A beta of 1.2 means that, on average, a 1% Nifty move came with a 1.2% move in the stock. Compute it from your own data:

Formula — beta \[ \beta = \frac{\operatorname{Cov}(R_{stock}, R_{market})}{\operatorname{Var}(R_{market})} \]
\(R_{stock}\)
The stock's return in each period, e.g. each week's % change in price (dividend-adjusted). A list of numbers, one per week.
\(R_{market}\)
The market index's return (here the Nifty 50) over the same weeks.
\(\operatorname{Cov}\)
Covariance: a measure of how much the two return series move together. Positive if the stock tends to rise in weeks when the market rises.
\(\operatorname{Var}\)
Variance: how much the market's returns spread out around their average. It is the covariance of the market with itself.

How it works: dividing "how much they move together" by "how much the market moves" gives the average stock move per 1% market move. It is the slope of the line through a scatter of stock returns against market returns. In a spreadsheet, SLOPE(stock returns, market returns) gives the same number.

Real example · PIDILITIND vs NIFTY 50 · Oct 2023 – Sep 2026

Computing Pidilite's beta and cost of equity

  1. Take weekly returns (Friday closes) for Pidilite (dividend-adjusted) and the Nifty 50 for the last 3 years: 156 weeks.
  2. Covariance of the two return series = 0.000248. Variance of Nifty returns = 0.000295.
  3. \(\beta = 0.000248 / 0.000295 = \mathbf{0.84}\). Pidilite has tended to move a little less than the market.
  4. \(K_e = 7.18\% + 0.84 \times 7.0\% = \mathbf{13.06\%}\).
Scatter of Pidilite weekly returns against Nifty weekly returns with a regression line of slope 0.84
Beta is the slope of this cloud. The correlation is only 0.57, so a lot of Pidilite's movement is stock-specific. Beta captures only the market-linked part.
Stockβ 2yβ 3yβ 5yCorrelation (3y)\(K_e\) = 7.18% + β(3y) × 7%
ITC0.450.510.650.3710.75%
Pidilite0.860.840.910.5713.06%
Asian Paints0.910.900.900.5113.48%
TCS0.960.950.920.5213.83%
HDFC Bank0.980.971.030.6413.97%
Tata Steel1.261.241.230.5915.86%
Trent1.321.271.270.3816.07%
Adani Enterprises1.511.501.600.5117.68%

Weekly returns to 30 Sep 2026 vs the Nifty 50. Beta changes with the window: ITC's ranges from 0.45 to 0.65. Use a few windows and pick a sensible middle.

Two refinements you will meet in research reports. (1) Adjusted beta: raw betas tend to drift towards 1 over time, so many data providers report \(\beta_{adj} = 0.67\,\beta_{raw} + 0.33\). For Pidilite: \(0.67 \times 0.84 + 0.33 = 0.89\), which lifts \(K_e\) from 13.06% to about 13.4%. (2) Levered vs unlevered beta: a stock's beta contains business risk plus the extra risk from its debt. To compare companies with different debt levels, analysts strip debt out, \(\beta_U = \beta_L / [1 + (1-t)\,D/E]\), and put the target company's own debt back in. Tata Steel (debt/equity 0.40 at market value) has an unlevered beta of about \(1.24 / (1 + 0.7483 \times 0.40) = 0.95\). Most of its above-market beta comes from leverage. We use raw betas in this chapter to keep the arithmetic visible.

6.2 Cost of debt and WACC

Formula — weighted average cost of capital \[ \text{WACC} = \frac{E}{D+E}\,K_e + \frac{D}{D+E}\,K_d\,(1-t) \]
WACC
Weighted average cost of capital: the blended yearly return required by all the company's investors, lenders and shareholders together, in %. It is the discount rate for FCFF.
\(E\)
Market value of equity: the market cap (share price × shares outstanding), in ₹ crore.
\(D\)
Debt: total borrowings, including lease liabilities, in ₹ crore.
\(\frac{E}{D+E},\ \frac{D}{D+E}\)
The weights: the share of total capital that comes from shareholders and from lenders. They add up to 1.
\(K_e\)
Cost of equity, from CAPM above.
\(K_d\)
Pre-tax cost of debt: roughly interest paid in the year ÷ average borrowings over the year, in %.
\(t\)
Tax rate. India's concessional corporate rate is 22% + 10% surcharge + 4% cess = 25.17%. It sat in section 115BAA of the Income-tax Act, 1961. From tax year 2026-27 the Income-tax Act, 2025 carries the same regime in section 200, at the same rates (checked Oct 2026). Most large listed companies have opted for it, which is why their reported tax rates cluster around 25–26%.
  1. Work out the after-tax cost of debt, \(K_d(1-t)\). Interest is tax-deductible, so debt costs less than its headline rate (the tax shield above).
  2. Multiply each cost by its weight: equity's share of capital × \(K_e\), and debt's share × after-tax \(K_d\).
  3. Add the two. A company with almost no debt has a WACC close to its cost of equity.
Real example · PIDILITIND · 30 Sep 2026

WACC for an almost debt-free company

  1. E = ₹1,465.1 × 101.45 cr shares = ₹1,48,628 cr. D = borrowings FY26 = ₹417 cr (mostly lease liabilities).
  2. Weights: E/(D+E) = 99.72%, D/(D+E) = 0.28%.
  3. \(K_d\) = interest ₹54 cr ÷ average borrowings ₹435.5 cr = 12.40%. After tax: 12.40% × (1 − 0.2517) = 9.28%.
  4. WACC = 0.9972 × 13.06% + 0.0028 × 9.28% = 13.05%. We round to 13.0%. With almost no debt, WACC ≈ cost of equity.
Real example · TATASTEEL · 30 Sep 2026

WACC when debt really matters

  1. E = ₹184.3 × 1,246.0 cr shares = ₹2,29,636 cr. D = ₹92,382 cr. Weights: equity 71.3%, debt 28.7%.
  2. \(K_d\) = interest ₹7,167 cr ÷ average borrowings (₹94,801 + ₹92,382)/2 = 7.66%. After tax: 5.73%.
  3. β = 1.24, so \(K_e\) = 7.18% + 1.24 × 7% = 15.86%.
  4. WACC = 0.713 × 15.86% + 0.287 × 5.73% = 12.95%. Cheap, tax-deductible debt pulls WACC well below the cost of equity. But more debt also raises equity risk (higher beta), so you cannot lower WACC forever by borrowing.

7. Terminal value: Gordon growth and exit multiple

We cannot forecast cash flows year by year forever. The standard approach forecasts explicitly for 5–10 years, then assumes the company settles into steady growth at rate \(g\) forever. The value of all cash flows after the forecast period, measured at the end of year \(N\), is the terminal value (TV).

Formula — Gordon growth (perpetuity) terminal value \[ TV_N = \frac{FCF_N \times (1+g)}{r - g}, \qquad PV(TV) = \frac{TV_N}{(1+r)^N} \]
\(N\)
The last year of the explicit forecast (10 in the Pidilite model).
\(FCF_N\)
The free cash flow forecast for year \(N\), in ₹ crore. \(FCF_N \times (1+g)\) is the first cash flow after the forecast, in year \(N+1\).
\(g\)
Terminal growth: the yearly rate at which cash flow is assumed to grow forever after year \(N\), as a decimal (5% = 0.05).
\(r\)
The discount rate: WACC if you are discounting FCFF.
\(TV_N\)
Terminal value: the value, measured at the end of year \(N\), of all cash flows from year \(N+1\) onwards, in ₹ crore.
\(PV(TV)\)
That terminal value brought back to today, using the present-value formula from Section 3.
  1. Grow the last forecast cash flow by one year: \(FCF_N \times (1+g)\).
  2. Divide by the gap \(r - g\). This one division adds up an endless stream of cash flows growing at \(g\) and discounted at \(r\).
  3. The answer is a value at year \(N\), not today, so divide by \((1+r)^N\) to get \(PV(TV)\).
  4. Only valid when \(r > g\). As \(g\) gets close to \(r\), the gap shrinks towards zero and the value explodes.

Intuition: a cash flow of ₹100 next year that grows 5% a year forever, discounted at 12%, is worth \(100 \times 1.05/(0.12-0.05) = ₹1{,}500\) at the end of year N. Nudge \(g\) to 6% and it becomes ₹1,766.7 (+18%). Nudge \(r\) down to 11% instead and it becomes ₹1,750. Small changes in the gap \((r - g)\) cause large changes in value. Keep this in mind for the sensitivity section.

How to choose terminal growth

No company can grow faster than the economy forever, or it would eventually become the economy. Varsity suggests a terminal growth near long-run inflation (3–5%). For an Indian company valued in rupees, many analysts allow up to roughly long-run nominal GDP growth, but anything above 6% needs a very strong argument. We use g = 5%. Always check that \(g\) is well below your discount rate.

The exit-multiple method

The alternative assumes the business is "sold" at the end of year N at a market multiple, for example \(TV_N = EBITDA_N \times\) EV/EBITDA multiple. It is popular with practitioners because it ties to market prices. But it imports today's market mood into a "fundamental" model. Always convert an exit multiple into the perpetual growth it implies and ask whether that growth is believable:

Formula — growth implied by a terminal value \[ g_{implied} = \frac{TV_N \cdot r - FCF_N}{TV_N + FCF_N} \]
\(TV_N\)
The terminal value at the end of year \(N\) from the exit multiple, e.g. year-\(N\) EBITDA × the EV/EBITDA multiple, in ₹ crore.
\(FCF_N\)
The free cash flow forecast for year \(N\), in ₹ crore.
\(r\)
The discount rate (WACC), as a decimal.
\(g_{implied}\)
The perpetual growth rate that would make the Gordon formula above give the same \(TV_N\).

How it works: this is the Gordon formula rearranged to solve for \(g\) instead of \(TV\). Put in the terminal value the multiple gives you, and it tells you how fast cash flow must grow forever to be worth that much. If the answer is well above long-run GDP growth, the multiple is too generous.

Example (Pidilite, Section 8 step 5, ₹ crore): a 20x exit multiple gives \(TV_{10} = 1{,}90{,}950\), with \(FCF_{10} = 5{,}270\) and \(r = 0.13\). \(g = (1{,}90{,}950 \times 0.13 - 5{,}270)/(1{,}90{,}950 + 5{,}270) = 19{,}553.5/1{,}96{,}220 = 9.97\%\) a year, forever.

8. A complete DCF: Pidilite Industries

Pidilite (Fevicol, Dr. Fixit, M-Seal) is a near-debt-free consumer business with high returns on capital. That suits a DCF, because its cash flows are positive and fairly predictable. Here is the full model, step by step. All figures are in ₹ crore unless marked otherwise.

₹1,943.5 cr
Base FCFF (3-yr avg)
13.0%
WACC
12% → 9%
Growth: yrs 1–5, 6–10
5%
Terminal growth
101.45 cr
Shares outstanding

Step 1 — Growth assumptions and why

Growth rates below are compound annual growth rates (CAGR): \(\text{CAGR} = (\text{End}/\text{Start})^{1/\text{years}} - 1\). For example, sales of ₹5,361 cr (FY16) to ₹14,601 cr (FY26) is \((14{,}601/5{,}361)^{1/10} - 1 = 10.5\%\) a year. Over FY16–FY26 Pidilite's sales grew 10.5% a year and its EBIT 11.3% a year. FCFF grew 15.2% a year (three-year average FY16–18 to FY24–26), partly because margins expanded. For the explicit forecast we assume 12% a year for years 1–5 (a little above sales history and below the FCF history, on the view that margin expansion cannot repeat forever), then 9% for years 6–10 as the business matures, then 5% forever. This follows Varsity's two-stage approach (Varsity used 18%/10% for Amara Raja in 2014), but with growth anchored to the company's own track record.

Step 2 — Project and discount the cash flows

YearFYGrowthFCFFDiscount factor \(1/1.13^t\)Present value
1FY2712%2,176.70.88501,926.3
2FY2812%2,437.90.78311,909.2
3FY2912%2,730.40.69311,892.3
4FY3012%3,058.10.61331,875.6
5FY3112%3,425.00.54281,859.0
6FY329%3,733.30.48031,793.2
7FY339%4,069.30.42511,729.7
8FY349%4,435.50.37621,668.5
9FY359%4,834.70.33291,609.4
10FY369%5,269.80.29461,552.4
Sum of PVs, years 1–1017,815

Example row: year 1 FCFF = 1,943.5 × 1.12 = 2,176.7, and its PV = 2,176.7 / 1.13 = 1,926.3. (The table is computed from the unrounded base, ₹1,943.43 cr. Starting from the rounded ₹1,943.5 moves later rows by ₹0.1–0.2 cr and leaves the per-share value at ₹418.2.) Notice how the PVs fall even though cash flows rise: discounting at 13% outruns 9–12% growth.

Bar chart of Pidilite projected FCFF for 10 years next to their present values at 13 percent
Future rupees (light) vs today's rupees (dark). The year-10 cash flow of ₹5,270 cr is worth only ₹1,552 cr today.

Step 3 — Terminal value

  1. \(TV_{10} = 5{,}269.8 \times 1.05 / (0.13 - 0.05) = \mathbf{69{,}167}\).
  2. \(PV(TV) = 69{,}167 / 1.13^{10} = 69{,}167 \times 0.2946 = \mathbf{20{,}376}\).

Step 4 — Enterprise value → equity value → per share

  1. Enterprise value = 17,815 + 20,376 = 38,191. The terminal value is 53.4% of it.
  2. Add cash and equivalents (299) and investments (4,350), and subtract borrowings including leases (417). Net cash = 4,232.
  3. Equity value = 38,191 + 4,232 = 42,423.
  4. Per share = 42,423 / 101.45 = ₹418.2.
Waterfall from PV of cash flows and terminal value to enterprise value, then adding cash and subtracting debt to equity value
The bridge from cash flows to a share price. Source: author's model on screener.in data.
Result: the model says ₹418, the market says ₹1,465

On 30 Sep 2026 Pidilite closed at ₹1,465.1, 3.5 times our base-case value. Varsity's ±10% modelling band is ₹376–₹460, and the price is far above it. Does that mean Pidilite is overvalued, or that the model is wrong? Possibly both, in part. Investors have paid 55–120x earnings for Pidilite for years, which implies they use a lower discount rate, expect faster growth for longer, or both. Section 10 turns the question around and asks what the price implies. That is usually more useful than arguing over one number.

Step 5 — Cross-check with an exit multiple

Suppose instead that at the end of FY36 the business is valued at 20x EBITDA, half its current ~40x. Grow FY26 EBITDA (₹3,521 cr) on the same path to ₹9,547 cr in year 10. Then \(TV = 20 \times 9{,}547 = 1{,}90{,}950\), its PV is 56,252, and value per share becomes ₹771.8. Now the terminal value is 75.9% of EV. Convert it into implied perpetual growth: \(g = (190{,}950 \times 0.13 - 5{,}270)/(190{,}950 + 5{,}270) = \mathbf{9.97\%}\) a year, forever. Even a "conservative" 20x exit multiple assumes Pidilite grows at almost 10% for eternity. That is how market multiples hide aggressive assumptions.

In your framework

framework.fundamentals.dcf(fcf, growth, discount, terminal_growth, years, net_debt, shares) implements exactly this model. Pass growth as a list for multi-stage growth, and pass net cash as a negative net_debt. dcf(1943.5, [0.12]*5 + [0.09]*5, 0.13, 0.05, net_debt=-4232, shares=101.45) returns a per-share value of ₹418.2 and terminal_share_pct of 53.4. framework.fundamentals.reverse_dcf(...) solves for implied growth (section 10). python -m framework.invest PIDILITIND prints them next to the quality scorecard. You will combine everything in chapter 17.

9. Sensitivity and margin of safety

A DCF is a machine for turning assumptions into a number. To see how fragile that number is, vary the two most powerful inputs, the discount rate and terminal growth, and look at the whole grid.

Heatmap of Pidilite value per share for WACC 11 to 15 percent and terminal growth 4 to 6 percent
Pidilite value per share (₹) for different WACC and terminal growth assumptions. Even the most generous cell (₹623) is less than half the market price.
WACC ↓ / g →4.0%4.5%5.0%5.5%6.0%
11%507529555586623
12%443459477497521
13%394405418433449
14%355364373383395
15%323330337345353

Stage-1 growth matters just as much. Keeping WACC at 13% and terminal growth at 5%, with stage-2 growth 3 points below stage 1 (minimum 5%), value per share is ₹326 at 8% growth, ₹369 at 10%, ₹418 at 12%, ₹507 at 15%, ₹617 at 18% and ₹705 at 20%.

Lines showing share of enterprise value from terminal value falling as WACC rises, for terminal growth 4, 5 and 6 percent
Terminal-value dominance. In our base case 53% of Pidilite's EV comes from years 11 to infinity. With a lower WACC it can exceed 70%.

Margin of safety

Because the inputs are uncertain, insist on buying well below your estimate. That cushion is the margin of safety, a term from Benjamin Graham.

Formula — buy price with a margin of safety \[ \text{Buy price} = \text{Intrinsic value} \times (1 - \text{MOS}) \]
Intrinsic value
Your estimate of value per share, e.g. from the DCF (₹418.2 for Pidilite), in ₹.
MOS
The margin of safety: the discount you insist on, as a decimal (30% = 0.30).
Buy price
The highest price at which you would buy, in ₹ per share.

How it works: knock a fixed percentage off your estimate and only buy at or below the result. If your estimate turns out too high by less than the margin, you still have not overpaid. The less certain the estimate, the bigger the margin should be.

How professionals actually use a DCF

They rarely trust the single output. They use it to learn which assumptions matter, to compare scenarios (bear / base / bull), and to ask "what must I believe to justify this price?" That last question is the reverse DCF, next.

10. Reverse DCF: what is the price assuming?

Instead of guessing growth and computing value, a reverse DCF takes the market price as given and solves for the growth rate (or the return) that makes the DCF value equal the price. Then you judge whether that growth is believable compared with the company's history and its industry.

Reverse DCF — solve for g \[ \text{Market cap} = \sum_{t=1}^{10} \frac{FCF_0 (1+g)^t}{(1+r)^t} \] \[ \qquad\qquad + \frac{FCF_0 (1+g)^{10} (1+g_T)}{(r-g_T)(1+r)^{10}} + \text{Net cash} \]
Market cap
Today's share price × shares outstanding, in ₹ crore. This is the known "answer" the market has given.
\(FCF_0\)
The base-year free cash flow (the subscript 0 means "today's starting point"). Here it is the three-year average of CFO − capex, in ₹ crore.
\(g\)
The unknown: the yearly FCF growth for years 1 to 10 that the price implies.
\(t\)
The forecast year, 1 to 10. \(\Sigma\) adds up the ten discounted cash flows.
\(r\)
The discount rate. The examples below use each company's cost of equity. These companies have almost no debt, so it is close to their WACC.
\(g_T\)
Terminal growth after year 10, fixed at 5%.
Net cash
Cash + investments − borrowings, in ₹ crore.
  1. The first line is the present value of ten years of FCF, each one \(FCF_0\) grown by \(g\) for \(t\) years and discounted for \(t\) years.
  2. The second line adds the terminal value (Section 7) of year 10's cash flow, discounted back 10 years, and then the net cash.
  3. Everything is known except \(g\). Try a value of \(g\), compute the right-hand side, and adjust \(g\) until it equals the market cap. Python's scipy.optimize.brentq or Excel's Goal Seek does this search for you.
  4. Compare the \(g\) you find with the company's past growth. If it is far higher, the price assumes a lot will go right.
Real example · ASIANPAINT · 30 Sep 2026

Asian Paints at ₹2,402.6

  1. Market cap = ₹2,402.6 × 95.50 cr shares = ₹2,29,440 cr. Net cash = cash 1,074 + investments 7,062 − borrowings 3,929 = ₹4,207 cr.
  2. Base FCF = average of FY24–FY26 (3,613; 2,604; 5,604) = ₹3,940 cr. FCF yield = 3,940 / 2,29,440 = 1.72%.
  3. Cost of equity = 7.18% + 0.90 × 7% = 13.48%.
  4. Solve: the price implies FCF growth of 26.9% a year for 10 years (23.4% at a 12% discount rate, 18.0% at 10%).
  5. History: sales grew 9.6% a year over FY16–FY26, net profit 9.3%, and EPS only 6.6% a year over FY21–FY26. Even FCF, flattered by a strong FY26, grew 18.7%.

Reading: even after a 33% fall from its 2022 peak, the price assumes Asian Paints' cash flows grow far faster than they ever have. Alternatively, run it the other way: if FCF grows like sales did (9.6% for 5 years, then 6.4%, then 5%), the price implies an expected return of only 7.4% a year, close to the risk-free G-sec yield of 7.18%.

Real example · ITC · 30 Sep 2026

ITC at ₹262.75

  1. Market cap = ₹262.75 × 1,247.81 cr shares = ₹3,27,863 cr. Net cash = 3,009 + 38,128 − 2,399 = ₹38,738 cr.
  2. Base FCF = average of FY24–FY26 (13,724; 15,524; 16,332) = ₹15,193 cr. FCF yield = 4.63%.
  3. Cost of equity = 7.18% + 0.51 × 7% = 10.75%.
  4. The price implies FCF growth of 5.5% a year for 10 years (8.3% at 12%, 3.7% at 10%).
  5. History: sales grew 7.2% a year over FY16–FY26 and FCF 7.6%. Implied growth is below history.

Reading: the price asks less of ITC than the business has historically delivered. If FCF grows like sales did (7.2%, then 5%), the implied expected return is 11.1% a year. That is not a buy signal by itself: tobacco regulation and taxation are real risks, and part of the 4.6% FCF yield reflects them. But the bar the business has to clear is low.

Bar chart comparing implied FCF growth at each company's cost of equity with actual sales and FCF growth for Asian Paints, ITC and Pidilite
Implied 10-year FCF growth (red) vs what each business actually delivered (grey, blue). Pidilite's price implies 28.7% a year at its 13.06% cost of equity (26.1% at 12%) against 10.5% sales growth and 15.8% FCF growth historically. Its implied return at history-like growth is 7.1%.
30 Sep 2026FCF yieldImplied g @ own \(K_e\)Implied g @ 12%Sales CAGR FY16–26Implied return if FCF grows like sales
Asian Paints1.72%26.9%23.4%9.6%7.4%
Pidilite1.40%28.7%26.1%10.5%7.1%
ITC4.63%5.5%8.3%7.2%11.1%
Limits of reverse DCF

It inherits every DCF weakness: the base FCF, the terminal growth and the discount rate are still your choices. Its real strength is psychological. It replaces "what is this worth?", which invites optimism, with "what has to go right?", which invites skepticism. If the answer is "growth no Indian consumer company has sustained for a decade", you have learned something important.

11. Dividend discount model (ITC)

For a mature company that pays out most of its earnings, the cash shareholders actually receive is the dividend. The dividend discount model (DDM) values the share as the PV of all future dividends. With constant growth it reduces to the Gordon formula:

Formula — Gordon dividend discount model \[ P_0 = \frac{D_1}{K_e - g} = \frac{D_0 (1+g)}{K_e - g} \] \[ \Longleftrightarrow\qquad g_{implied} = \frac{K_e P_0 - D_0}{P_0 + D_0} \]
\(P_0\)
The value of one share today (the subscript 0 means "now"), in ₹. In the second formula it is today's market price.
\(D_0\)
The dividend per share paid over the last year, in ₹.
\(D_1\)
The dividend per share expected over the next year, in ₹. \(D_1 = D_0 \times (1+g)\).
\(K_e\)
Cost of equity from CAPM (Section 6), as a decimal.
\(g\)
The yearly growth rate of the dividend, assumed to last forever. Must be below \(K_e\).
\(g_{implied}\)
The forever growth rate that today's price is assuming.
\(\Longleftrightarrow\)
"Is equivalent to": the right-hand formula is the left-hand one rearranged.

How it works: it is the same perpetuity idea as the terminal value in Section 7, applied to dividends. Next year's dividend divided by the gap \(K_e - g\) gives the value of all future dividends. Turn it around, plug in today's price, and you get the growth rate the market is assuming.

Real example · ITC · FY26 dividend, price 30 Sep 2026

Valuing ITC on its dividends

  1. FY26 EPS = ₹16.51, payout ratio 88%, so \(D_0\) ≈ 16.51 × 0.88 = ₹14.53. (Dividends actually paid in the 12 months to 30 Sep 2026 per our price file: ₹14.50.) Dividend yield = 14.53 / 262.75 = 5.53%.
  2. \(K_e\) = 10.75% (from CAPM above).
  3. At g = 5%: \(D_1\) = 14.53 × 1.05 = 15.26, and \(P_0 = 15.26/(0.1075 - 0.05) = \mathbf{₹265.3}\). The market price is ₹262.75.
  4. At g = 4%: ₹223.9. At g = 6%: ₹324.2. A one-point change in growth moves value by about ±20%.
  5. Implied growth at today's price: \((0.1075 \times 262.75 - 14.53)/(262.75 + 14.53) = \mathbf{4.95\%}\).

The DDM and the FCF reverse DCF agree: the market is pricing ITC for roughly 5% long-run growth.

When DDM fails

DDM is useless for companies that pay little or no dividend but reinvest heavily (DMart, Trent, Titan), because their value comes from reinvestment, not payouts. It also breaks when payout ratios change a lot. Use it for high-payout, slow-growth businesses: ITC, Coal India, some PSUs and utilities. Varsity's core modules focus on DCF for this reason.

12. Relative valuation: P/E, P/S, P/B, EV/EBITDA, PEG

Multiples are shortcuts: price divided by some measure of what you get. They are quick and they reflect market reality, but they hide the assumptions a DCF makes explicit. Use them to compare like with like: a company with its own history, or with close peers.

12.1 Price to earnings (P/E)

Formula — P/E and earnings yield \[ P/E = \frac{\text{Price per share}}{\text{EPS}} = \frac{\text{Market cap}}{\text{Net profit}} \] \[ \text{Earnings yield} = \frac{1}{P/E} \]
Price per share
Today's share price, in ₹.
EPS
Earnings per share: net profit for a year ÷ number of shares, in ₹. Trailing (TTM) EPS uses the last four quarters.
Market cap
Price × shares outstanding, in ₹ crore.
Net profit
Profit after tax for the same 12 months, in ₹ crore.
Earnings yield
Profit as a % of the price you pay: the P/E turned upside down.

How it works: dividing per share or for the whole company gives the same answer, because the number of shares cancels out. Earnings yield flips the ratio so you can compare it with an interest rate.

Example (Pidilite, 30 Sep 2026, table below): \(1{,}465.1 / 26.02 = 56.3\). Earnings yield \(= 1/56.3 = 1.78\%\), against a 7.18% G-sec yield.

P/E is how many rupees investors pay today for one rupee of annual profit. Its inverse, the earnings yield, lets you compare a stock with a bond. A P/E of 20 is an earnings yield of 5%. A trailing P/E uses the last 12 months' EPS (TTM). A forward P/E uses next year's estimate, which is more relevant but is someone's guess.

Why P/Es differ (the logic): from the Gordon model, a "fair" P/E ≈ payout × (1 + g)/(\(K_e\) − g). P/E rises with growth and with the quality (sustainability) of growth, and falls with risk and with interest rates. A high P/E is not "bad". It is a bet that growth will be high and long-lasting.

P/E band chart. Plot price alongside lines of EPS × fixed multiples. You immediately see whether the stock is trading at the top or bottom of its historical range.

Pidilite price with dashed lines at 40, 55, 70 and 85 times trailing EPS from 2016 to 2026
Pidilite P/E bands. In January 2022 the price touched 123x trailing EPS. By 30 Sep 2026 it was 56x: a big de-rating, even though EPS roughly doubled. EPS steps are annual until FY24, then trailing four quarters, each applied from about 45–60 days after the period ends. Prices and EPS are adjusted for the 2025 1:1 bonus.
Four panels of trailing P/E history for Pidilite, Asian Paints, ITC and TCS with median lines and interquartile shading
Trailing P/E histories, Jun 2016 – Sep 2026. All four sat at or below the bottom of their 10-year interquartile range on 30 Sep 2026. Whether that means "cheap" is the subject of section 13.
30 Sep 2026Price ₹TTM EPS ₹P/E now10y median P/E10y 25th pct10y range
Pidilite1,465.126.0256.374.261.436.7–123.5
Asian Paints2,402.649.6848.466.858.746.5–113.0
ITC262.7515.8416.625.917.610.3–39.3
TCS2,050.6137.6414.928.522.814.6–45.8
Titan4,587.064.8970.785.974.039.9–247.5
DMart3,801.446.9481.0121.4102.178.4–313.7
HDFC Bank708.751.3513.823.920.013.4–34.3

Varsity's personal rule of thumb is to avoid stocks above 25–30x earnings. Today's Indian market routinely pays more for consumer franchises. Treat such rules as starting points, and always ask what growth the multiple implies (section 10).

12.2 Price to sales (P/S)

Formula \[ P/S = \frac{\text{Market cap}}{\text{Sales}} \]
Market cap
Price × shares outstanding, in ₹ crore.
Sales
Revenue for the last 12 months (TTM), in ₹ crore.

How it works: it tells you how many rupees investors pay for each rupee of yearly sales. Because sales are rarely negative, it still works when profits are tiny or losses. But a rupee of sales is worth more when more of it turns into profit, so read it next to the net margin.

Useful when earnings are temporarily depressed or negative, for example a cyclical at the bottom or a young company. Always read it next to the profit margin. Pidilite trades at 1,48,628 / 15,399 TTM sales = 9.65x sales with a 17.4% net margin. Asian Paints trades at 2,29,440 / 37,187 = 6.17x sales with a 13.0% net margin. A rupee of Pidilite's sales carries more profit, which partly explains the higher P/S.

12.3 Price to book (P/B), the right lens for banks

Formula — P/B and justified P/B \[ P/B = \frac{\text{Price}}{\text{Book value per share}}, \qquad \text{Justified } P/B = \frac{ROE - g}{K_e - g} \]
Price
Today's share price, in ₹.
Book value per share
(BVPS) Shareholders' equity on the balance sheet ÷ number of shares, in ₹.
ROE
Return on equity: net profit ÷ average shareholders' equity (chapter 7), in %. The long-run level you expect the bank to sustain.
\(g\)
Long-run yearly growth rate of earnings and book value, in %.
\(K_e\)
Cost of equity from CAPM (Section 6), in %.

How it works: the first ratio is what the market pays per rupee of book value. The second is what it should pay given the bank's returns. A bank earning exactly its cost of equity (ROE = \(K_e\)) makes the top and bottom equal, so it is worth exactly book (P/B = 1). Earn more and it deserves a premium, earn less and it deserves a discount.

A bank's assets (loans) and liabilities (deposits) are financial and carried close to their real value, so book value means something. Its "raw material" is money, which makes EV and FCF awkward. For manufacturing or consumer businesses whose value lies in brands and know-how, P/B means little.

Real example · HDFCBANK · FY26 consolidated, price 30 Sep 2026

Is HDFC Bank's P/B justified by its ROE?

  1. Book value FY26 = ₹5,86,059 cr; shares 1,540.11 cr; BVPS = ₹380.5. P/B = 708.7/380.5 = 1.86.
  2. ROE = FY26 profit 79,219 / average equity (5,21,789 + 5,86,059)/2 = 14.3%.
  3. \(K_e\) = 7.18% + 0.97 × 7% = 13.97%. Assume long-run g = 6%.
  4. Justified P/B = (14.3% − 6%) / (13.97% − 6%) = 1.04, well below the actual 1.86.
  5. Reverse it: to justify 1.86 at a 13.97% cost of equity, sustainable ROE would need to be about 20.9%. Or, at a 14.3% ROE, investors must be using a cost of equity of only about 10.5%.

The market is betting on higher future ROE than FY26's (the post-merger dip), or it treats HDFC Bank as lower-risk than CAPM suggests. Both are judgements you have to make.

Why chapter 7 shows slightly different numbers (P/B 1.94, ROE 14.0%): it uses the standalone bank. Here we use consolidated figures, because the share price also pays for the subsidiaries (HDB Financial, HDFC Life, HDFC AMC and others). Both are fine as long as price, book value and profit come from the same basis.

Scatter of P/B against FY26 ROE for five large banks with justified P/B lines at cost of equity 12 and 14 percent
Five large banks: actual P/B vs FY26 consolidated ROE, with justified-P/B lines. Kotak (ROE 11.4%, P/B 2.29) and ICICI (17.1%, 2.61) sit above both lines; SBI (16.0%, 1.48) sits near them. P/B must be read with ROE and asset quality, which chapter 7 covers.

12.4 EV/EBITDA

Formula \[ EV = \text{Market cap} + \text{Debt} - \text{Cash}, \qquad \frac{EV}{EBITDA} \]
EV
Enterprise value: the market value of the whole business, shareholders' part plus net debt, in ₹ crore.
Market cap
Price × shares outstanding, in ₹ crore.
Debt
Total borrowings, in ₹ crore.
Cash
Cash and equivalents, in ₹ crore.
EBITDA
Earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation for the last 12 months (TTM), in ₹ crore: operating profit before any charges for debt or fixed assets.

How it works: first build EV: what you would pay for all the shares, plus the debt you would take on, minus the cash you would get. Then divide by EBITDA. The answer is how many years of current operating profit the whole business costs.

EV/EBITDA is capital-structure neutral. EV includes debt and EBITDA is before interest, so a heavily indebted company and a debt-free one can be compared fairly. It also ignores depreciation policies. That makes it the standard multiple for capital-heavy, leveraged sectors: steel, cement, telecom, power, infrastructure. Its blind spot is that EBITDA ignores capex, which in these sectors is huge and very real.

Real example · TATASTEEL · TTM to Jun 2026, price 30 Sep 2026

Why P/E and EV/EBITDA disagree for a leveraged company

  1. Market cap ₹2,29,636 cr + borrowings ₹92,382 cr − cash ₹10,058 cr = EV ₹3,11,960 cr.
  2. TTM EBITDA ₹36,189 cr. EV/EBITDA = 8.6x.
  3. P/E = market cap ÷ TTM consolidated net profit (₹11,263 cr) = 20.4x. On TTM EPS attributable to Tata Steel's own shareholders (₹8.83, which excludes the minority share), price ÷ EPS = 20.9x. Either way, interest (₹7,085 cr TTM) and heavy depreciation (₹12,850 cr TTM) eat most of the EBITDA before it reaches shareholders, so P/E looks "expensive" while EV/EBITDA looks moderate. Compare steel with steel on EV/EBITDA, and note net debt/EBITDA (2.27x here) as a risk measure.
Bar chart of EV/EBITDA and P/E for paints, steel and cement companies on 30 Sep 2026
Multiples differ hugely between sectors (the three large paint and adhesive makers ~28–40x EBITDA, smaller Kansai Nerolac 14.5x, vs steel and aluminium 7–12x), so only compare within a sector. EV = market cap + borrowings − cash and equivalents. Prices on 30 Sep 2026 (non-course stocks from Yahoo Finance), financials screener.in TTM.

12.5 PEG ratio

Formula \[ PEG = \frac{P/E}{\text{EPS growth rate (\% per year)}} \]
\(P/E\)
The price-to-earnings ratio from 12.1 (here, trailing 12 months).
EPS growth rate
Yearly growth in earnings per share, entered as a plain number of percent (11.3% is entered as 11.3, not 0.113). The table below uses the 5-year CAGR from FY21 to FY26.

How it works: divide the P/E by the growth rate to see how much you pay per point of growth. A PEG near 1 means the P/E roughly matches the growth rate. The result is only as good as the growth number you put in.

Example (TCS, table below): P/E 14.9, EPS growth 9.2% a year, so PEG = 14.9 / 9.2 = 1.62.

PEG adjusts P/E for growth. A popular rule of thumb (from Peter Lynch) says PEG ≈ 1 is fair and below 1 is attractive. The catch is that the growth used must be sustainable future growth, and past growth can be badly distorted:

30 Sep 2026TTM P/EEPS FY21EPS FY265y EPS CAGRPEGCaution
HDFC Bank13.828.8749.3911.3%1.22Bank: also read P/B, ROE
TCS14.987.67136.019.2%1.62Past growth may not repeat
Titan70.710.9657.1439.1%1.81FY21 was a COVID-hit base: growth flattered
ITC16.610.6916.519.1%1.83FY21 was a COVID-hit base; the hotels business was demerged in Jan 2025, so FY26 EPS excludes it
Pidilite56.311.1324.0616.7%3.38
DMart81.016.9745.5621.8%3.71
Asian Paints48.432.7345.096.6%7.31Earnings dipped in FY25
Trent77.3−2.7432.25n/mn/mLoss-making base: PEG undefined

12.6 Which multiple when?

Business typePrimary multiple(s)Avoid / be careful with
Steady consumer, IT services, pharmaP/E (vs own history and peers), PEG, DCF/reverse DCFP/B (brands are not on the balance sheet)
Banks, NBFCs, insurersP/B with ROE, P/EEV/EBITDA, FCF-based DCF
Cyclicals: metals, cement, chemicals, autosEV/EBITDA on mid-cycle EBITDA, P/B at troughsP/E at peak earnings (section 13)
Capital-heavy and leveraged: telecom, power, infraEV/EBITDA, net debt/EBITDAP/E (distorted by interest and depreciation)
High-payout, slow growth: ITC, utilities, PSUsDividend yield, DDM, FCF yieldPEG (growth too low to be meaningful)
Loss-making or early-stageP/S (with a path to margins), scenario DCFP/E, PEG (undefined)

13. Valuation pitfalls, with real failures

13.1 Garbage in, garbage out

A DCF has no opinion of its own. It multiplies whatever you feed it. Our Pidilite value moves from ₹326 to ₹705 just by changing stage-1 growth from 8% to 20%. Defend each input with history, industry context and management commentary. Write your reasons down (Varsity suggests a "working notes" sheet), and update the model when facts change, not when the price changes.

13.2 Terminal value dominance

In our base case 53% of Pidilite's value comes from cash flows after 2036, and with an exit multiple it is 76%. If most of your answer depends on what happens more than 10 years away, be humble about precision and generous with margin of safety.

13.3 Cyclicals: the low P/E trap

For commodity businesses, earnings swing far more than the business's long-term value. At the top of the cycle, earnings are huge and P/E looks tiny. At the bottom, earnings collapse and P/E looks enormous. Reading those P/Es naively gets you exactly backwards.

Tata Steel EPS bars by fiscal year with price on 31 March and labels showing P/E and next 12 month return
Tata Steel, FY17–FY26: EPS for each year, price on 31 March, the P/E on that year's EPS, and the next 12 months' price return. Source: screener.in, NSE via Yahoo Finance (split-adjusted).
31 MarEPS for the year ₹Price ₹P/ENext 12 months
201811.9357.14.8−11.3%
20199.0750.65.6−46.8%
20201.3827.019.5+201.1%
20216.2681.213.0+61.0%
202232.88130.74.0−20.1%
20237.17104.514.6+49.1%
2024−3.55155.9loss−1.0%
20252.74154.256.3+24.4%
20268.65191.922.2—

The three lowest P/Es (4.0, 4.8, 5.6) were all followed by price falls. The highest (19.5 in March 2020 on collapsed earnings, and 56.3 in 2025) were followed by gains of 201% and 24%. FY22 EPS of ₹32.88 was a peak: it fell to ₹7.17 the next year and to a loss the year after. For cyclicals, value the business on normalised (mid-cycle) earnings, or use EV/EBITDA on average-cycle EBITDA and P/B, never on peak P/E. Note that these P/Es use each year's full EPS, which the market only learned after the year ended, so they flatter the "low P/E" signal. In real time it would have looked even more convincing, and been even more wrong.

13.4 One-off gains distort P/E

Real example · HINDUNILVR and ITC · 2025–2026

The "cheap" P/E that wasn't

  1. Hindustan Unilever's TTM EPS on 30 Sep 2026 is ₹63.66, giving a P/E of just 29.5 against a 10-year median of about 64.
  2. But the Dec-2025 quarter shows EPS of ₹28.12 with other income of ₹4,048 cr. The other three quarters earned ₹11.38–₹12.73 with other income of ₹113–₹503 cr. A one-off gain sits in that quarter.
  3. Replace the Dec-2025 quarter with the average of the other three and normalised EPS = ₹47.39. The P/E becomes 39.7, much closer to screener.in's own figure.
  4. ITC had the same issue: its Mar-2025 quarter EPS of ₹15.76 (vs about ₹4 normally) included a gain linked to the hotels demerger. That is why its P/E chart dips to 10–15x from mid-2025 to mid-2026 (figure in 12.1).

Rule: before trusting any P/E, scan the last four quarters for jumps in "other income" or "exceptional items" (chapter 6).

13.5 Negative or tiny free cash flow: DCF does not fit

DMart's three-year average CFO − capex is −₹525 cr, because it keeps buying land and building stores. Titan's FCF yield is only 0.39%, because gold inventory absorbs cash as it grows. A mechanical DCF values both near zero or below. That says nothing useful about their worth: their value is in the returns on reinvestment. For such businesses, model a future steady state (when capex slows) or use P/E and ROCE-based reasoning instead.

13.6 Look-ahead bias: the buy zone that only worked in hindsight

Here is a tempting rule: "buy when P/E is below its 10-year 25th percentile." On Asian Paints, using the full 2016–2026 history to set the threshold (59x), the median 1-year return after an in-zone day was +15.7% vs +8.6% otherwise. Great?

No. That threshold used the future. Redo it honestly: each day, use only the trailing 5 years of P/E to set the 25th-percentile threshold (testable from Oct 2018):

Real-time rule, Oct 2018 – Sep 2025 start datesDays in zoneMedian 1-yr return in zoneMedian 1-yr return otherwise% of in-zone days with a loss
Asian Paints400−6.5%+11.6%56%
Pidilite204+2.1%+15.9%41%
ITC654−4.5%+7.0%52%
TCS156−30.4%+8.6%100%

In real time, "below its usual P/E" was followed by worse returns for all four. De-ratings tend to persist: a P/E usually falls because the outlook changed, and it can keep falling. This does not mean P/E bands are useless. It means a low P/E is a reason to research, not a reason to buy, and that any rule you test must use only information available at the time. Chapter 12 covers backtesting discipline in depth.

13.7 Value traps and changed regimes

Real example · TCS · Sep 2024 → Sep 2026

Earnings up, price down by half

  1. 30 Sep 2024: TCS closed at ₹4,268.5 on trailing EPS of ₹129.21, a P/E of 33.0.
  2. 30 Sep 2026: ₹2,050.6 on EPS of ₹137.64, a P/E of 14.9.
  3. EPS rose 6.5% while the price fell 52.0%. The whole loss came from the multiple.

The market re-rated the entire business: slower growth, new competitive threats, a changed view of what IT services will earn. A 10-year P/E median of 28.5 is meaningless if the next 10 years look different. A stock that keeps getting "cheaper" because its prospects keep shrinking is a value trap. Reverse DCF helps here: at ₹2,050.6, TCS's 6.05% FCF yield implies only 5.7% a year FCF growth at a 12% discount rate. The question is whether even that is achievable, and a P/E chart cannot answer it.

13.8 Other common mistakes

14. Valuing the whole market: Nifty P/E and bond yields

An index has a P/E too: NSE divides the combined free-float market cap of the 50 stocks by their combined earnings and publishes the Nifty's P/E, P/B and dividend yield daily (Varsity: NSE website → indices → historical P/E, P/B & dividend yield).

19.36
Nifty 50 P/E (30 Sep 2026)
2.78
Nifty P/B
1.22%
Dividend yield
5.17%
Earnings yield (1/PE)
7.18%
10-yr G-sec yield
Weekly Nifty 50 P/E from October 2016 to September 2026 with a red line marking the March 2021 switch to consolidated earnings and a band for the post-2021 mean plus or minus one standard deviation
Nifty 50 trailing P/E, weekly. Data: NSE index valuation figures via craytheon.com (CSV in data/extra). The jump down on 31 Mar 2021 is a methodology change, not a market move.
Methodology break: do not compare across 2021

On 31 Mar 2021 NSE switched the index P/E from standalone to consolidated earnings. Consolidated profits are larger, so the P/E dropped overnight (39.51 to 33.60 in our weekly data) with no change in price. Varsity's well-known guide, written in 2014 on standalone data ("cautious above 22x, attractive at 16x or below"), cannot be applied directly to today's numbers. Use only the post-April-2021 history for comparison.

Where the market stands (post-Apr-2021 consolidated series): mean 22.57, standard deviation 2.50, range 18.92–33.60. At 19.36 on 30 Sep 2026, only about 1% of weekly readings since April 2021 were lower. A year earlier the P/E was 21.86. The Nifty fell 8.1% over the year (24,611.1 → 22,620.45). The P/E implies trailing Nifty EPS of about 22,620.45 / 19.36 ≈ 1,168.

Earnings yield vs bond yield

Compare what stocks "earn" on their price with what a risk-free bond pays. The yield gap = earnings yield − G-sec yield. The bond-equity earnings yield ratio (BEER) = G-sec yield ÷ earnings yield.

Real example · NIFTY 50 · 30 Sep 2026

Stocks vs bonds today

  1. Earnings yield = 1 / 19.36 = 5.17%. G-sec = 7.18%.
  2. Yield gap = 5.17% − 7.18% = −2.01 points. BEER = 7.18 / 5.17 = 1.39.
  3. Since April 2021 the monthly gap averaged −2.36 points, ranging from −2.93 (Apr 2021, expensive stocks) to −1.73 (May 2025). Today is on the "less expensive than usual" side of that range.

Indian equities almost always yield less than bonds on current earnings, because investors expect earnings to grow and bond coupons do not. The change in the gap is more informative than its level.

Monthly Nifty earnings yield and 10-year G-sec yield from 2016 to 2026
Nifty earnings yield (green) vs 10-year G-sec yield (red), month-ends. G-sec data: countryeconomy.com (CSV in data/extra). Pre-2021 earnings yields are understated by the standalone methodology.

Does a low market P/E predict higher returns?

Scatter of Nifty starting P/E against the next 52-week return, colored by pre and post 2021 methodology
Each dot is a week: starting P/E vs the Nifty's price return over the next 52 weeks.
Starting P/E (post-Apr-2021, weekly)WeeksMedian next-52-week return% of weeks with a loss
Below 2145+15.2%4%
21–23120+8.0%21%
23–2537+1.8%30%
Above 2534+3.0%26%

Post-2021 the correlation between starting P/E and next-year return is −0.25: a modest tendency, with huge scatter. In 2016–2021 it was only −0.06, because 2020's collapsed earnings made the P/E spike just before a huge rally (the same cyclical trap as Tata Steel, at index level). With only about five years of comparable data and overlapping windows, treat this as context, not a timing tool. A low index P/E improves your odds over years. It does not tell you next month's direction, so swing traders should still trade price (chapters 3–5).

15. Building a watchlist with buy-zone prices

Valuation pays off when you prepare. Decide in advance, calmly, what you would pay for businesses you like. When the market offers that price (often in a panic), you act on a plan instead of a feeling. Varsity notes that long-term opportunities "linger": a stock can sit in a value zone for months, so there is no need to rush.

A simple two-lens process

  1. Quality gate first (chapter 7): only businesses with consistent ROCE, cash conversion and clean governance get on the list.
  2. Lens 1, own history: P/E buy level = 25th-percentile P/E (10 years) × TTM EPS. It tells you when the stock is cheap relative to how the market usually values it.
  3. Lens 2, cash flows: reverse DCF at a fixed 12% discount rate and 5% terminal growth. Compare the implied growth with the better of the 5-year EPS CAGR and the 10-year sales CAGR. It tells you whether the price needs heroics.
  4. Optional DCF value: stage-1 growth = 10-year sales CAGR (capped at 15%), stage 2 = two-thirds of that (at least 5%), terminal 5%, discount 12%. Then apply a 25% margin of safety.
  5. Classify: both lenses favourable means research in depth; only one means keep watching; neither means move on. Re-run quarterly after results.
30 Sep 2026PriceP/E nowP/E buy level (25th pct × EPS)Implied FCF g @12%Hist. growth (max of EPS 5y, sales 10y)DCF @12% / with 25% MOSClassification by the rule
Pidilite1,465.156.31,59826.1%16.7%454 / 341Cheap vs own history; price still needs above-history growth
Asian Paints2,402.648.42,91623.4%9.6%825 / 619Cheap vs own history; price still needs above-history growth
ITC262.7516.62798.3%9.1%232 / 174Both lenses favourable: research in depth
TCS2,050.614.93,1385.7%9.4%2,423 / 1,817Both lenses favourable: research in depth (but see 13.7)
Titan4,587.070.74,802n/m39.1%n/mFCF yield 0.39%: DCF not meaningful, P/E lens only
DMart3,801.481.04,793n/m23.1%n/mNegative FCF: DCF not meaningful, P/E lens only

Source: author's calculations (script course/scripts/ch08_figures.py). The classification is the mechanical output of the rule above, shown to illustrate the method. It is not a recommendation.

How to read this honestly:

And when do you sell?

Varsity's closing chapter on fundamentals gives three good reasons to exit a long-term holding. Write them down next to your buy level:

A falling price on its own is not on this list. If the thesis holds and value has not changed, a lower price only improves the margin of safety. That is where position sizing and the risk limits of chapter 11 come in: they keep you able to hold, or add, through a drawdown.

Asian Paints price with a shaded band between minimum P/E and 25th percentile P/E times EPS, and a dashed median P/E line
A P/E-band "buy zone" moves with earnings. Asian Paints touched it in 2016–2019, again from mid-2024, and sits inside it on 30 Sep 2026. In hindsight the zone looks great; in real time it was much less reliable (section 13.6).
Turning this into your own system

Keep a spreadsheet or a Python dict per stock: quality score, buy level, fair value range, implied growth, your thesis in two lines, what would make you sell. Update after each quarterly result. In chapter 17 you will wire framework.fundamentals.quality_scorecard, dcf and reverse_dcf into a single python -m framework.invest SYMBOL report, and combine it with chart-based entries from chapters 3–5.

16. Try it yourself (Python)

These snippets need a copy of the course repository and Python with pandas and numpy (setup steps are in its framework/README.md). Run them from the repository's root folder, for example with .venv/bin/python, because the file paths are relative to that folder. Each reproduces a number from this chapter using the course data. The full analysis, every figure and every number is in course/scripts/ch08_figures.py, which writes all values to data/extra/ch08_numbers.json.

1. Beta and cost of equity

import pandas as pd, numpy as np
D = "data/ohlc/"
stock = pd.read_csv(D + "PIDILITIND.csv", index_col=0, parse_dates=True)["Adj Close"]
nifty = pd.read_csv(D + "IDX_NSEI.csv", index_col=0, parse_dates=True)["Close"]
df = pd.concat([stock, nifty], axis=1, keys=["s", "m"], sort=True).loc["2023-09-30":"2026-09-30"].dropna()
w = df.resample("W-FRI").last().pct_change().dropna()        # weekly returns
beta = np.cov(w.s, w.m)[0, 1] / w.m.var()
rf, erp = 0.0718, 0.07
print(f"weeks={len(w)}  beta={beta:.2f}  cost of equity={rf + round(beta, 2) * erp:.2%}")
# -> weeks=156  beta=0.84  cost of equity=13.06%

2. A DCF with a sensitivity grid

def dcf(fcf0, growth, r, g, net_cash, shares):
    """growth = list of yearly growth rates; returns (value per share, TV share of EV)."""
    pv, fcf = 0.0, fcf0
    for t, gt in enumerate(growth, start=1):
        fcf *= 1 + gt
        pv += fcf / (1 + r) ** t
    tv = fcf * (1 + g) / (r - g)                 # Gordon growth terminal value at year N
    pv_tv = tv / (1 + r) ** len(growth)
    ev = pv + pv_tv
    return (ev + net_cash) / shares, pv_tv / ev

# Pidilite, Rs crore: 3-yr avg FCFF, 12% x5 then 9% x5, WACC 13%, g 5%
value, tv_share = dcf(1943.5, [0.12] * 5 + [0.09] * 5, 0.13, 0.05, net_cash=299 + 4350 - 417, shares=101.45)
print(f"value/share Rs {value:.0f}, terminal value = {tv_share:.0%} of EV")   # Rs 418, 53%

for r in [0.11, 0.12, 0.13, 0.14, 0.15]:          # sensitivity row by row (g = 4%, 5%, 6%)
    print(f"WACC {r:.0%}:", [round(dcf(1943.5, [0.12]*5 + [0.09]*5, r, g, 4232, 101.45)[0]) for g in (0.04, 0.05, 0.06)])

3. Reverse DCF (ITC)

from scipy.optimize import brentq

def equity_value(fcf0, g10, r, g_term, net_cash):
    pv, fcf = 0.0, fcf0
    for t in range(1, 11):
        fcf *= 1 + g10
        pv += fcf / (1 + r) ** t
    pv += fcf * (1 + g_term) / (r - g_term) / (1 + r) ** 10
    return pv + net_cash

fcf0, net_cash, mcap = 15193, 38738, 327863      # Rs crore, price Rs 262.75
for r in (0.10, 0.1075, 0.12):
    g = brentq(lambda x: equity_value(fcf0, x, r, 0.05, net_cash) - mcap, -0.3, 0.8)
    print(f"discount {r:.2%}: price implies {g:.1%} FCF growth for 10 years, then 5%")
# -> 3.7%, 5.5%, 8.3%

4. A simple P/E history (annual EPS only)

import pandas as pd
px = pd.read_csv("data/ohlc/ASIANPAINT.csv",
                 index_col=0, parse_dates=True)["Close"].loc["2016-06-01":]
eps_fy = {2016: 18.19, 2017: 20.22, 2018: 21.26, 2019: 22.48, 2020: 28.20, 2021: 32.73,
          2022: 31.59, 2023: 42.81, 2024: 56.92, 2025: 38.23, 2026: 45.09}   # screener.in, consolidated
eps = pd.Series({pd.Timestamp(f"{y}-05-31"): v for y, v in eps_fy.items()})  # known by end-May
eps = eps.reindex(px.index.union(eps.index)).ffill().reindex(px.index)
pe = px / eps
print(pe.describe().round(1))
print("25th pct P/E:", round(pe.quantile(.25), 1), "-> buy level on FY26 EPS:", round(pe.quantile(.25) * 45.09))
# median 66.8, 25th pct 58.5 -> 2,639. (The chapter uses quarterly TTM EPS from 2024, so its numbers differ slightly.)

5. Earnings yield vs G-sec

import pandas as pd
X = "data/extra/"
v = pd.read_csv(X + "ch08_nifty_pe_pb_dy_weekly_craytheon.csv", parse_dates=["Date"], index_col=0)
y = pd.read_csv(X + "ch08_india_10y_gsec_monthend_countryeconomy.csv", parse_dates=["Date"], index_col=0)
m = pd.concat([100 / v.pe.resample("ME").last(), y.Yield10y.resample("ME").last()], axis=1,
              keys=["earn_yield", "gsec"], sort=True).dropna()
m["gap"] = m.earn_yield - m.gsec
print(m.loc["2021-04":].describe().round(2))   # gap mean -2.36, range -2.93 to -1.73
print(m.tail(3).round(2))                      # Sep 2026: 5.17 vs 7.18, gap -2.01

Exercises with the code: (a) change Pidilite's WACC to 11% and stage-1 growth to 15% and see how far you get towards ₹1,465; (b) run the reverse DCF for Asian Paints (FCF 3,940, net cash 4,207, market cap 2,29,440); (c) compute beta over 5 years instead of 3 for ITC and see how \(K_e\) changes.

17. Practical checklist

18. Key takeaways

Key takeaways

19. Quiz and exercises

Q1. What is ₹50,000 receivable in 4 years worth today at 10%? And what does ₹50,000 invested today grow to in 4 years at 10%?
PV = 50,000 / 1.104 = 50,000 / 1.4641 = ₹34,150.67. FV = 50,000 × 1.4641 = ₹73,205. Discounting and compounding are mirror images.
Q2. A company has EBIT ₹1,000 cr, tax rate 25%, depreciation ₹150 cr, capex ₹300 cr, and its working capital rose by ₹80 cr. Compute FCFF.
NOPAT = 1,000 × (1 − 0.25) = 750. FCFF = 750 + 150 − 300 − 80 = ₹520 cr. Interest is not deducted, because FCFF belongs to both lenders and shareholders.
Q3. Using \(R_f\) = 7.18% and ERP = 7%, what is the cost of equity for a stock with β = 1.24 (Tata Steel)? Why can't you lower Tata Steel's WACC indefinitely by borrowing more?
\(K_e\) = 7.18% + 1.24 × 7% = 15.86%. Debt is cheaper (after tax 5.73% for Tata Steel) so adding it lowers WACC at first. But more debt raises financial risk: equity beta rises, lenders demand higher rates, and the chance of distress grows. Beyond some point WACC rises again.
Q4. A company's year-10 FCF is ₹500 cr. WACC 12%, terminal growth 5%. Compute the terminal value and its present value. Then recompute TV with g = 6%.
TV = 500 × 1.05 / (0.12 − 0.05) = 525 / 0.07 = ₹7,500 cr. PV = 7,500 / 1.1210 = 7,500 / 3.1058 = ₹2,414.8 cr. At g = 6%: TV = 530 / 0.06 = ₹8,833.3 cr, 17.8% higher from a one-point change in g.
Q5. In our Pidilite DCF, enterprise value is ₹38,191 cr, cash ₹299 cr, investments ₹4,350 cr, borrowings ₹417 cr and shares 101.45 cr. Compute value per share and Varsity's ±10% band. With the price at ₹1,465.1, what would Varsity's rule say?
Equity = 38,191 + 299 + 4,350 − 417 = 42,423; per share = 42,423 / 101.45 = ₹418.2. Band = ₹376–₹460. The price is far above the upper band, so the rule says do not buy on this model. Then check the assumptions with a reverse DCF before concluding the stock is overvalued.
Q6. Asian Paints' reverse DCF implies 26.9% a year FCF growth for 10 years. Its sales grew 9.6% a year over FY16–26. What are three possible explanations, and what would you check?
(1) The market uses a lower discount rate than 13.48%: at 10% the implied growth drops to 18.0%. (2) It expects margins and FCF to grow much faster than sales, for example from lower raw-material costs or capex falling after a build-out. (3) The stock is overvalued even after its de-rating. Check the margin history, the capex plan, competition (new entrants in paints), and management guidance in concalls. Then decide which explanation you believe.
Q7. ITC: \(D_0\) = ₹14.53, \(K_e\) = 10.75%, price ₹262.75. Find value at g = 5% and the implied g at today's price. When would DDM be a poor choice?
\(D_1\) = 14.53 × 1.05 = 15.26; value = 15.26 / (0.1075 − 0.05) = ₹265.3. Implied g = (0.1075 × 262.75 − 14.53)/(262.75 + 14.53) = 4.95%. DDM is poor for companies that pay small or irregular dividends and reinvest heavily (DMart, Trent, Titan), or whose payout ratio is changing.
Q8. A bank has ROE 16%, cost of equity 13%, and long-run growth 6%. What P/B is justified? If it trades at 2.5x book, what ROE is the market implying?
Justified P/B = (16% − 6%)/(13% − 6%) = 10/7 = 1.43x. Implied ROE = g + P/B × (\(K_e\) − g) = 6% + 2.5 × 7% = 23.5%, a demanding assumption for a large bank.
Q9. Tata Steel traded at 4.0x FY22 EPS on 31 Mar 2022. Why was this not a bargain, and how should you value a cyclical instead?
FY22 EPS (₹32.88) was a cyclical peak: it fell to ₹7.17 in FY23 and to a loss in FY24, and the stock fell 20.1% over the next 12 months. Low P/E at peak earnings is a warning, not a signal. Value cyclicals on normalised mid-cycle earnings or EBITDA (EV/EBITDA on average-cycle EBITDA), check P/B near troughs, and watch net debt/EBITDA.
Q10. HUL's TTM P/E is 29.5 versus a 10-year median of ~64. List the steps before concluding it is cheap.
(1) Check the quarters: the Dec-2025 quarter had EPS of ₹28.12 and other income of ₹4,048 cr, a one-off. Normalised EPS ≈ ₹47.39, so the P/E is about 39.7. (2) Ask whether the business changed. A demerger can change the earnings base, so compare with the right history. (3) Run a reverse DCF on FCF. (4) Remember 13.6: even a genuinely low P/E versus history did not reliably predict good returns in real time.
Q11. Nifty P/E is 19.36 and the 10-year G-sec yields 7.18%. Compute the earnings yield, yield gap and BEER. Why can't you compare 19.36 with Varsity's 2014 thresholds of 16x and 22x?
Earnings yield = 1/19.36 = 5.17%; gap = 5.17 − 7.18 = −2.01 points; BEER = 7.18/5.17 = 1.39. Since 31 Mar 2021 NSE computes P/E on consolidated earnings, which are larger, so P/Es are structurally lower than the standalone figures Varsity's thresholds came from. Compare only with the post-2021 range (mean 22.57, low 18.92).
Q12. A friend backtests "buy Pidilite when its P/E is below its 10-year 25th percentile" and reports excellent results. What is the flaw, and how do you fix the test?
The 25th percentile was computed over the full 10 years, including future data the investor could not have known: look-ahead bias. Fix it by computing the threshold each day from trailing data only (for example the previous 5 years). Done properly in this chapter, Pidilite's median 1-year return in the zone was +2.1% vs +15.9% otherwise, the opposite of the hindsight result.

20. Sources

Zerodha Varsity, Module 3, Fundamental Analysis: Ch. 11 The Financial Ratio Analysis (Part 3): valuation ratios and index valuation · Ch. 13 Equity Research (Part 1) · Ch. 14 DCF Primer · Ch. 15 Equity Research (Part 2): FCF, terminal value, NPV, share price, intrinsic value band · Ch. 16 The Finale: DCF limitations, margin of safety, when to sell.
Zerodha Varsity, Module 13, Integrated Financial Modelling: Ch. 14 Valuation Overview · Ch. 15 FCFF and FCFE · Ch. 16 Risk Premium and Tax Shield · Ch. 17 WACC and Terminal Growth · Ch. 18 Discounted Cash Flow Analysis. All concepts are explained in the course's own words.
Rates and premiums (checked Oct 2026): 10-year G-sec yield 7.18% on 30 Sep 2026, countryeconomy.com (month-end history saved to data/extra/ch08_india_10y_gsec_monthend_countryeconomy.csv); cross-check 7.16%, Trading Economics. Equity risk premium: Damodaran, Country Default Spreads and Risk Premiums (updated 5 Jan 2026): India total ERP 7.08%; Incwert, Assessment of India ERP, Jan 2026 (7.0%). Corporate tax 25.17% (section 115BAA of the 1961 Act; section 200 of the Income-tax Act, 2025 from tax year 2026-27): caclubindia (AY 2022-23 to 2026-27), TaxTMI, section (new) 200 / (old) 115BAA, incometaxindia.gov.in.
Nifty 50 P/E, P/B and dividend yield (weekly, Oct 2016 – Oct 2026): NSE index data as compiled by craytheon.com (saved to data/extra/ch08_nifty_pe_pb_dy_weekly_craytheon.csv); official source niftyindices.com historical P/E, P/B & Div. Yield. Switch to consolidated earnings on 31 Mar 2021: Upstox Learning Center.
Company financials: screener.in consolidated pages fetched 2 Oct 2026 (data/extra/screener_ch07/). Prices: NSE daily OHLC via Yahoo Finance to 30 Sep 2026 (data/ohlc/, data/extra/ch07_extra_closes_yf.csv). Calculations and figures: course/scripts/ch08_figures.py; all numbers in data/extra/ch08_numbers.json.

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