Ledger & Candle
Chapter 07 · Fundamental Analysis

Ratios, Quality & Sector Analysis

Reading time ~55 min · Data as of 30 Sep 2026 · Based on Zerodha Varsity Module 3 (Fundamental Analysis, ch. 9–14) and the Varsity Sector Analysis module

1. What you'll learn and why it matters

In Chapter 6 you learned to read the three financial statements. The numbers in them are large and hard to compare. Is a profit of ₹4,395 crore good? It depends on how much was invested to earn it, how much debt it carries, how fast it is growing, and what the market charges you for a share of it. Ratios answer those questions by dividing one number by another, so that a paint company with ₹8,000 crore of sales and an IT company with ₹2.7 lakh crore of sales can be compared on the same scale.

By the end of this chapter you will be able to:

Why this matters for each of your goals

Long-term investor: ratios are the main filter. They separate businesses that compound capital from businesses that consume it. Swing / positional trader: when you trade only fundamentally sound stocks, a failed setup is less likely to turn into a permanent loss, and quarterly results stop catching you by surprise. Futures trader: stock futures are leveraged. Knowing a company's debt, cash flow and valuation helps you judge how badly a results-day gap could hurt a position.

Read this first

Every company example below is a historical analysis for learning. None of it is a buy or sell recommendation. Ratios describe the past, while prices react to what the market expects next. Later sections show real cases where "great ratios" were followed by years of falling share prices.

2. How to read any ratio (and where the numbers come from)

Varsity opens its ratio chapters with a warning that is easy to forget: a ratio on its own tells you very little. A 19% EBITDA margin is excellent for a supermarket and poor for a software exporter. A ratio means something only when you compare it in one of two ways:

  1. Across peers: companies in the same industry that sell similar things to similar customers, such as TCS against Infosys, or Asian Paints against Berger.
  2. Across time: the same company's ratio over 5–10 years, which shows whether it is improving, stable or deteriorating.
Diagram of the four ratio families: profitability, leverage, operating, valuation, with growth and cash checks underneath
The ratio families used in this chapter. Varsity's four groups overlap, so treat the boundaries as loose.

Conventions used in this chapter

Accounting policies differ

Varsity also warns that accounting policies vary between companies and change over time. Depreciation methods, revenue recognition and one-off "exceptional items" can shift a ratio without any change in the business. Before you conclude that one company is better than another, check that both are measured the same way.

3. Profitability ratios: EBITDA margin, PAT margin, ROE, ROA, ROCE

Profitability ratios ask two questions. How much of each rupee of sales does the company keep (margins)? How much profit does it earn on the capital invested in it (returns)? High and stable profitability is the clearest numerical sign that a company has some advantage over its competitors.

3.1 EBITDA margin (operating margin)

What it is: profit from the core business before interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation, as a share of operating revenue. The logic: it strips out how the company is financed (interest), its tax situation, and its accounting for old investments (depreciation). What remains shows how efficiently management turns sales into operating profit. Other income, such as treasury gains or interest on cash, is excluded because it is not the core business.

Formula\[ \text{EBITDA} = (\text{Total revenue} - \text{Other income}) - (\text{Total expenses} - \text{Finance cost} - \text{D\&A}) \] \[ \text{EBITDA margin} = \frac{\text{EBITDA}}{\text{Operating revenue}} \]
Total revenue
Sales (revenue from operations) plus other income for the year, in ₹ crore. The top lines of the P&L.
Other income
Interest, dividends and treasury gains: money that does not come from the core business.
Total expenses
Every expense in the P&L for the year, including finance cost and D&A.
Finance cost
Interest on borrowings and lease liabilities.
D&A
Depreciation and amortisation: this year's share of the cost of plants, machines and intangibles.
Operating revenue
Total revenue minus other income, which is just sales.
EBITDA
Earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation. Screener calls it "Operating Profit" and gets it in one step as Sales − Expenses, because its "Expenses" line already leaves out interest and depreciation.
  1. Remove other income from total revenue. What is left is sales from the core business.
  2. Remove finance cost and D&A from total expenses. What is left is the cost of running the business.
  3. Subtract the second from the first: that is EBITDA. Divide by operating revenue and multiply by 100 for the margin in %. Higher means more of each rupee of sales is kept before financing and asset costs.

Example (Asian Paints FY26, inputs from the worked example after 3.5): total revenue \(= 35{,}584 + 728 = 36{,}312\). Total expenses \(= 28{,}884 + 195 + 1{,}229 = 30{,}308\) (screener's expenses plus interest plus depreciation). EBITDA \(= (36{,}312 - 728) - (30{,}308 - 195 - 1{,}229) = 35{,}584 - 28{,}884 = 6{,}700\). Margin \(= 6{,}700 / 35{,}584 = 18.8\%\).

3.2 PAT margin (net profit margin)

This is the bottom-line profit after every expense, including interest, depreciation and tax. Varsity divides by total revenue (sales plus other income). The DuPont formula in Section 4 uses sales alone. Both are common, so state which one you used.

Formula\[ \text{PAT margin} = \frac{\text{Profit after tax}}{\text{Total revenue}} \]
Profit after tax
Net profit for the year, the bottom line of the P&L, in ₹ crore. Screener's consolidated "Net Profit" includes the minority shareholders' share (Section 2).
Total revenue
Sales plus other income for the same year.

How it works: the paise of net profit the company keeps from each ₹1 it takes in, after every cost. Multiply by 100 for %. For Asian Paints FY26 it is 4,395 ÷ 36,312 = 12.1%. Dividing by sales alone (4,395 ÷ 35,584) gives 12.35%, the "net margin" used in Section 4.

3.3 Return on Equity (ROE)

ROE shows how much profit the company earns for each rupee that shareholders have put in or left in the business as retained earnings. Varsity calls it one of the most important ratios. It notes that top Indian companies average roughly 14–16%, and the author prefers 18% or more. The logic: a company earning 25% on equity and reinvesting its profits can compound shareholder wealth quickly. A company earning 8% on equity, which is below what you would earn in a fixed deposit after accounting for risk, is quietly destroying value.

Formula\[ \text{ROE} = \frac{\text{Net profit}}{\text{Average shareholders' equity}} \qquad \text{Equity} = \text{Share capital} + \text{Reserves} \]
Net profit
Profit after tax for the year, in ₹ crore.
Average equity
(Equity at the start of the year + equity at the end) ÷ 2. For FY26 that means the balance sheets of Mar-25 and Mar-26.
Share capital
Number of shares × face value, from the balance sheet.
Reserves
Profits kept in the business over the years, plus share premium and other reserves (Chapter 6, section 6.2).

How it works: divide the year's profit by the shareholders' money that was in the business during that year, and multiply by 100. The result is the profit earned for each ₹100 of equity. The average is used because profit builds up over the whole year, while equity is a snapshot on one date. Higher is better: Varsity prefers 18% or more. Always check how much debt sits behind it (3.7). The worked example after 3.5 runs it for Asian Paints.

3.4 Return on Assets (ROA)

ROA asks how much the company earns on everything it owns, whether funded by shareholders or lenders. Varsity adds back after-tax interest, because lenders also fund the assets. This puts a debt-heavy and a debt-free company on the same footing.

Formula\[ \text{ROA} = \frac{\text{Net profit} + \text{Interest} \times (1 - \text{tax rate})}{\text{Average total assets}} \]
Net profit
Profit after tax for the year, in ₹ crore.
Interest
Finance cost for the year, from the P&L.
Tax rate
The effective tax rate, tax ÷ PBT, as a decimal (27% = 0.27).
After-tax interest
\(\text{Interest} \times (1 - \text{tax rate})\). Interest lowers taxable profit, so its real cost to the company is less than the amount paid.
Average total assets
(Total assets at the start of the year + at the end) ÷ 2.

How it works: adding back after-tax interest gives the profit earned for all funders, lenders as well as owners. Dividing by the assets they funded shows how hard those assets work. Higher is better, but levels differ a lot by industry: for banks about 1% is acceptable (Section 9). Simpler versions skip the interest add-back: the bank examples and the Piotroski test (Section 10) use net profit ÷ assets. The framework's ratios() uses the full formula above, and net profit ÷ average assets for banks. The worked example after 3.5 runs the full version for Asian Paints.

3.5 Return on Capital Employed (ROCE)

ROCE measures pre-tax operating return on all long-term capital, debt plus equity. Because it ignores how the capital is split, it is the fairest way to compare a borrower with a non-borrower. A useful rule: if ROCE is below the company's cost of borrowing, every rupee of debt reduces shareholder returns.

Formula\[ \text{ROCE} = \frac{\text{EBIT}}{\text{Capital employed}} = \frac{\text{PBT} + \text{Interest}}{\text{Equity} + \text{Short-term debt} + \text{Long-term debt}} \]
EBIT
Earnings before interest and tax = PBT + interest, for the year, in ₹ crore. This version includes other income (see the tip in Section 5).
PBT
Profit before tax.
Interest
Finance cost for the year.
Capital employed
All the long-term money in the business: equity plus all borrowings. Use the average of the opening and closing figures, as the worked example does.
Equity
Share capital + reserves.
Short- / long-term debt
Borrowings due within a year and after a year. Screener's single "Borrowings" line covers both, and includes lease liabilities.

How it works: profit before paying lenders or the taxman, divided by the money that lenders and owners together have put in, times 100. Because the split between debt and equity does not matter, it compares borrowers with non-borrowers fairly. Higher is better. The framework's quality scorecard treats a 5-year average of 10% as poor and 25% as good. If ROCE is below the interest rate on the company's debt, borrowing is hurting shareholders. The worked example below runs it for Asian Paints.

Real example · ASIANPAINT · FY2026 (year to Mar-2026)

All five profitability ratios, step by step

Inputs (₹ cr, consolidated): Sales 35,584; Expenses 28,884; Other income 728; Depreciation 1,229; Interest 195; PBT 6,003; Tax rate 27%; PAT 4,395. Equity Mar-26 = 96 + 21,276 = 21,372; Mar-25 = 96 + 19,304 = 19,400. Borrowings 3,929 (Mar-26) and 2,290 (Mar-25). Total assets 34,519 and 30,355.

  1. EBITDA = 35,584 − 28,884 = 6,700. EBITDA margin = 6,700 ÷ 35,584 = 18.8%.
  2. PAT margin (Varsity) = 4,395 ÷ (35,584 + 728) = 4,395 ÷ 36,312 = 12.1%.
  3. ROE: average equity = (21,372 + 19,400) ÷ 2 = 20,386, so ROE = 4,395 ÷ 20,386 = 21.6%.
  4. ROA: numerator = 4,395 + 195 × (1 − 0.27) = 4,537.4; average assets = (34,519 + 30,355) ÷ 2 = 32,437, so ROA = 14.0%.
  5. ROCE: EBIT = 6,003 + 195 = 6,198; average capital employed = ((21,372 + 3,929) + (19,400 + 2,290)) ÷ 2 = 23,495.5, so ROCE = 26.4%.

Reading it: each ratio needs a benchmark before it means anything, so compare with the table below. Asian Paints earns higher margins and returns than Berger and Kansai Nerolac but lower than Pidilite. Its FY26 ROE of 21.6% is also below its own 5-year average of about 25% (screener), as large new competitors entered decorative paints.

Real example · Peer tables · FY2026

IT services, paints and FMCG side by side

CompanyEBITDA marginPAT marginROEROCEROAGross margin*
IT services
TCS27.1%18.5%49.0%59.9%29.7%n.m.
INFY23.7%16.2%31.2%39.2%19.7%n.m.
HCLTECH20.6%12.7%23.0%29.4%15.8%n.m.
WIPRO19.2%13.7%15.6%17.9%10.7%n.m.
Paints & adhesives
ASIANPAINT18.8%12.1%21.6%26.4%14.0%41.9%
BERGEPAINT15.4%9.4%17.3%21.5%12.2%34.0%
KANSAINER12.1%7.1%8.8%12.1%7.1%34.0%
PIDILITIND24.1%16.6%24.0%31.4%17.1%50.6%
FMCG
HINDUNILVR23.3%21.7%30.7%36.8%19.3%49.6%
NESTLEIND22.7%15.0%76.3%87.6%28.5%51.0%
ITC34.6%25.8%29.5%38.7%23.2%54.2%
BRITANNIA18.3%13.1%53.6%56.3%28.3%35.0%

*Gross margin = 1 − (material + manufacturing cost) ÷ sales, from screener's expense breakdown. It is not meaningful (n.m.) for IT services, whose main cost is salaries.

What jumps out:

Grouped bar chart comparing EBITDA margin, net margin, ROE and ROCE for TCS, Infosys, HCL Tech and Wipro for FY2026
IT services peer comparison, FY2026. Same industry, very different economics. Source: screener.in consolidated data; ratios computed in course/scripts/ch07_data.py.

3.6 Trends beat snapshots

Varsity's Amara Raja example looks at four years of EBITDA margin, not one, because a rising margin shows that management is gaining control over costs. The paint industry over 12 years makes the same point.

Line chart of EBITDA margin FY2015 to FY2026 for Asian Paints, Berger Paints, Kansai Nerolac and Pidilite
EBITDA margin (Operating profit ÷ Sales) for paints and adhesives, FY2015–FY2026. Every company was hit in FY22, when crude-linked raw material costs rose. The leaders recovered faster. Source: screener.in.
Real example · Margin cycle · FY2021 → FY2022

Margins move with input costs, and leaders recover first

Asian Paints' EBITDA margin fell from 22.4% (FY21) to 16.5% (FY22). Kansai Nerolac's fell from 17.0% to 10.2%. Both faced the same raw material shock. By FY24 Asian Paints was back to 21.4%, while Kansai reached only 13.2%. Lesson: a one-year margin drop shared by the whole industry is a cyclical event. A margin that stays below peers year after year is a structural weakness.

3.7 How debt flatters ROE: a worked thought experiment

Varsity explains ROE's main weakness with a small pizza-shop example. Here is our own version, which also charges interest on the loan.

Worked example · Hypothetical bakery

Same oven, same profit, three ways to fund it

Asha needs a ₹20,000 oven. Before interest, the bakery earns ₹4,000 a year in a normal year and ₹1,500 in a bad year. Any loan costs 10% a year. (Tax is ignored to keep the arithmetic simple.)

FundingEquityLoanInterestROE, normal yearROE, bad year
All own money20,000004,000/20,000 = 20%1,500/20,000 = 7.5%
Half borrowed10,00010,0001,0003,000/10,000 = 30%500/10,000 = 5%
Three-quarters borrowed5,00015,0001,5002,500/5,000 = 50%0/5,000 = 0%

Debt pushed ROE from 20% to 50% in a good year and from 7.5% to 0% in a bad one. The business stayed exactly the same. Only the risk changed. This is why you never read ROE without checking leverage, and why DuPont analysis exists.

Common mistakes with profitability ratios

4. DuPont: taking ROE apart

DuPont Corporation developed this method in the 1920s. It splits ROE into three multiplied parts. When you multiply them, the fractions cancel back to PAT ÷ Equity, so nothing changes mathematically. What you gain is a view of where the return comes from. Varsity calls it the best way to look at ROE because it shows the quality of the return as well as its size.

DuPont 3-step\[ \text{ROE} = \underbrace{\frac{\text{PAT}}{\text{Sales}}}_{\text{net margin}} \times \underbrace{\frac{\text{Sales}}{\text{Avg total assets}}}_{\text{asset turnover}} \times \underbrace{\frac{\text{Avg total assets}}{\text{Avg equity}}}_{\text{equity multiplier}} \]
PAT
Profit after tax for the year, in ₹ crore.
Sales
Revenue from operations for the year.
Avg total assets
(Total assets at the start of the year + at the end) ÷ 2.
Avg equity
(Shareholders' equity at the start + at the end) ÷ 2.
Net margin
Profit per ₹1 of sales, shown as a %.
Asset turnover
₹ of sales produced by each ₹1 of assets in a year, written as "×".
Equity multiplier
₹ of assets supported by each ₹1 of equity, written as "×". 1.0× would mean no liabilities at all.
  1. Work out the three pieces separately. The labels under the curly braces name each one.
  2. Multiply them. Sales and average total assets each appear once on top and once underneath, so they cancel, leaving PAT ÷ average equity, which is ROE.
  3. Compare each piece with peers and with past years to see which one drives the ROE: margin (pricing power), turnover (efficiency) or the multiplier (borrowing, the riskiest route).

The framework's dupont(fin) uses the same average balances, so it reproduces the figures here.

Real example · ASIANPAINT · FY2026

DuPont with real numbers

  1. Net margin = PAT ÷ Sales = 4,395 ÷ 35,584 = 12.35%
  2. Asset turnover = 35,584 ÷ 32,437 (average assets) = 1.097×
  3. Equity multiplier = 32,437 ÷ 20,386 (average equity) = 1.591×
  4. ROE = 0.1235 × 1.097 × 1.591 = 21.6%, the same as the direct calculation in Section 3.

Asian Paints' ROE comes mainly from margin. Leverage is modest: about ₹1.59 of assets for each ₹1 of equity, and most of the non-equity part is supplier credit, not bank debt.

Four-panel horizontal bar chart showing net margin, asset turnover, equity multiplier and resulting ROE for seven companies
Three different routes to ROE (FY2026). DMart reaches 12.9% with a thin 4.3% margin but 2.56× asset turnover. Titan's ROE uses the most leverage (3.70×, mainly gold metal loans). HDFC Bank, like any bank, has asset turnover below 0.1× and needs about 7.8× leverage to reach a 14% ROE.
Real example · DuPont peer table · FY2026

Same formula, different businesses

CompanyNet margin (PAT/Sales)Asset turnoverEquity multiplierROE (product)
TCS18.5%1.57x1.68x49.0%
INFY16.5%1.18x1.60x31.2%
HCLTECH12.8%1.19x1.52x23.0%
WIPRO14.3%0.69x1.58x15.6%
NESTLEIND15.1%1.83x2.77x76.3%
ASIANPAINT12.4%1.10x1.59x21.6%
DMART4.3%2.56x1.17x12.9%
TITAN5.8%1.73x3.70x37.1%
TATASTEEL4.7%0.81x2.96x11.3%

TCS against Wipro: net margin differs modestly (18.5% against 14.3%) and leverage is almost identical (1.68× against 1.58×). The big gap is asset turnover: 1.57× against 0.69×. Wipro carries large goodwill from acquisitions and a lot of cash, so each rupee of assets produces less revenue. DuPont points straight at the cause, which a single ROE number cannot do.

Titan: its 37% ROE looks outstanding, but 3.70× of it is leverage. That leverage comes mostly from gold borrowed for jewellery inventory, which is a normal practice in that business. You only notice it by doing DuPont and then reading the borrowings note in the annual report.

How to use DuPont in practice

Track the three parts over five years. A rising ROE driven by rising margin or turnover is healthy. A rising ROE driven only by a rising equity multiplier should worry you, because the company is borrowing more to show the same improvement.

5. Leverage ratios: how much risk is in the balance sheet

Varsity calls debt a double-edged sword. Debt helps when the money earns more than the interest it costs. It hurts when profits fall and interest still has to be paid, as the bakery example showed. Leverage (solvency) ratios measure how much debt there is and how comfortably it can be serviced. Liquidity ratios (5.1) check the next twelve months.

Formulas \[ \text{Debt/Equity} = \frac{\text{Short-term} + \text{Long-term borrowings}}{\text{Shareholders' equity}} \] \[ \text{Debt/Assets} = \frac{\text{Total debt}}{\text{Total assets}} \qquad \text{Financial leverage} = \frac{\text{Avg total assets}}{\text{Avg equity}} \] \[ \text{Interest coverage} = \frac{\text{EBIT}}{\text{Interest}} = \frac{\text{EBITDA} - \text{D\&A}}{\text{Finance cost}} \] \[ \text{Debt/EBITDA} = \frac{\text{Total debt}}{\text{EBITDA}} \qquad \text{Net debt/EBITDA} = \frac{\text{Debt} - \text{Cash}}{\text{EBITDA}} \]
Borrowings / debt
All borrowings at year-end, short-term (due within a year) plus long-term, in ₹ crore. "Total debt" and "Debt" mean the same thing. Screener's "Borrowings" line also includes lease liabilities.
Shareholders' equity
Share capital + reserves at year-end.
Total assets
The balance-sheet total at year-end.
Avg assets / equity
Averages of the opening and closing figures. Financial leverage is the same number as DuPont's equity multiplier.
EBITDA
Operating profit for the year (3.1).
D&A
Depreciation and amortisation for the year.
EBIT
Here EBITDA − D&A, which leaves out other income (see the tip below).
Interest / Finance cost
Interest charged in the P&L for the year.
Cash
Cash and equivalents at year-end.

How it works: D/E, Debt/Assets and financial leverage measure how much of the funding is borrowed. Interest coverage measures how many times the year's operating profit covers the interest bill. Debt/EBITDA is roughly how many years of operating profit it would take to repay all the debt; the "net" version subtracts cash first, and a negative value means more cash than debt. All except Debt/Assets (a %) are written as "×". The paragraph after the tip explains what levels are safe, and the Tata Steel example after 5.1 works every one through.

Two versions of EBIT: know which one you are reading

Here EBIT = EBITDA − D&A, which leaves out other income. That is the stricter test, because treasury income can vanish in a bad year. The ROCE formula in Section 3.5 and Chapter 6 use EBIT = PBT + interest, which includes other income. For Asian Paints FY26 the two give 5,471 ÷ 195 = 28.1× and 6,198 ÷ 195 = 31.8×; for Tata Steel, 3.1× and 3.2×. Neither is wrong. Use one version consistently when comparing companies.

Logic of each: D/E shows who funds the company, owners or lenders. A value above 1 means more lending than equity. Interest coverage shows how many times operating profit covers the interest bill, and below about 2–3× one bad year can threaten solvency. Debt/EBITDA is roughly how many years of operating profit it would take to repay all debt, and lenders often become uneasy above about 3×. Net debt subtracts cash, because a company with ₹100 debt and ₹90 cash is not really leveraged.

5.1 Short-term liquidity: current ratio and quick ratio

Leverage ratios ask whether the company can carry its debt over years. Liquidity ratios ask a nearer question: can it pay the bills due in the next 12 months? Current assets are items that turn into cash within a year (cash, receivables, inventory). Current liabilities are amounts due within a year (supplier bills, short-term loans, the current part of long-term debt).

Formulas\[ \text{Current ratio} = \frac{\text{Current assets}}{\text{Current liabilities}} \qquad \text{Quick ratio} = \frac{\text{Current assets} - \text{Inventory}}{\text{Current liabilities}} \]
Current assets
Items on the year-end balance sheet that turn into cash within 12 months: cash, receivables, inventory. In ₹ crore.
Current liabilities
Amounts due within 12 months: supplier bills, short-term loans, the part of long-term debt due this year.
Inventory
Raw materials, work-in-progress and finished goods: the slowest current asset to turn into cash.

How it works: divide what will turn into cash within a year by what must be paid within a year. A current ratio of 1.5 means ₹1.50 of short-term assets for every ₹1 due. The quick ratio takes inventory out first, so it is always lower and is the stricter test. Both are written as plain numbers.

Logic: a current ratio above about 1.2–1.5 means short-term assets comfortably cover short-term dues. The quick ratio leaves out inventory, because stock may take months to sell, and it is the stricter test. Read both against the business model. A company with a negative cash conversion cycle (Section 6), whose customers pay it before it pays suppliers, can safely run a current ratio near 1. A falling current ratio at a company with a long cash cycle is the warning sign. Example: using the proxy built in Section 10, Asian Paints' current ratio slipped from 1.76 (Mar-25) to 1.66 (Mar-26). That is still comfortable, but it cost a Piotroski point. Tata Steel's proxy is about 0.67, which is typical for a steelmaker that funds itself partly through supplier credit, but it leaves little room in a bad year. Screener's summary balance sheet does not split current and non-current items, so for exact figures use the balance sheet in the annual report.

Real example · TATASTEEL · FY2026

Leverage ratios for a capital-heavy business

Inputs (₹ cr): Borrowings 92,382; Equity 1,247 + 1,00,920 = 1,02,167; Total assets 2,96,515; EBITDA 34,352; Depreciation 11,955; Interest 7,167; Cash 10,058.

  1. D/E = 92,382 ÷ 1,02,167 = 0.90. Lenders fund almost as much as shareholders.
  2. Debt/Assets = 92,382 ÷ 2,96,515 = 31% of assets financed by debt.
  3. EBIT = 34,352 − 11,955 = 22,397. Interest coverage = 22,397 ÷ 7,167 = 3.1×.
  4. Debt/EBITDA = 92,382 ÷ 34,352 = 2.69×. Net debt/EBITDA = (92,382 − 10,058) ÷ 34,352 = 2.40×.

Reading it: these numbers are manageable while steel prices hold. But Tata Steel's EBITDA swung from ₹63,490 cr (FY22) to ₹22,248 cr (FY24) in two years. At FY24's EBITDA, the same debt would be about 4× EBITDA. For cyclical businesses, test leverage against a bad-year EBITDA, not the current one.

CompanyDebt/EquityDebt/AssetsFin. leverage (avg A/avg E)Interest coverDebt/EBITDANet debt/EBITDA
TATASTEEL0.9031.2%2.96x3.1x2.69x2.40x
JSWSTEEL0.9936.8%2.84x2.2x3.37x1.98x
HINDALCO0.7328.8%2.34x7.5x2.84x2.42x
ULTRACEMCO0.3116.8%1.87x6.6x1.40x1.32x
SHREECEM0.085.9%1.34x8.7x0.40x0.33x
AMBUJACEM0.011.0%1.51x13.4x0.13x-0.01x
TITAN1.9550.6%3.70x6.4x3.66x3.43x
BAJAJ-AUTO0.5829.5%1.77x10.7x1.73x1.50x
ASIANPAINT0.1811.4%1.59x28.1x0.59x0.43x
TCS0.116.2%1.68x54.5x0.16x-0.02x
Scatter of debt to equity against interest coverage on a log scale for 27 companies coloured by sector
Leverage map, FY2026. Most consumer, IT and pharma companies sit top-left: little debt and huge interest cover. Metals sit bottom-right, near the danger lines. Titan is an outlier because of gold metal loans.
Leverage traps for beginners

6. Operating (efficiency) ratios and the cash conversion cycle

Varsity also calls these "activity" or "management" ratios. They measure how efficiently the company uses its assets and its working capital. That is the cash tied up in stock and in money customers owe, minus the credit suppliers give.

Turnover ratios \[ \text{Asset turnover} = \frac{\text{Sales}}{\text{Avg total assets}} \qquad \text{Fixed-asset turnover} = \frac{\text{Sales}}{\text{Avg (net block + CWIP)}} \] \[ \text{Working-capital turnover} = \frac{\text{Sales}}{\text{Avg (CA} - \text{CL)}} \]
Sales
Revenue from operations for the year, in ₹ crore.
Avg (…)
The average of the opening and closing values of whatever is in the brackets.
Avg total assets
Average of the balance-sheet totals at the start and end of the year.
Net block
Fixed assets after depreciation (Chapter 6, section 6.4).
CWIP
Capital work in progress: plant still being built.
CA − CL
Current assets minus current liabilities (5.1), also called net working capital.

How it works: each ratio says how many rupees of sales one rupee of that asset produced in the year, written as "×". Higher means the assets work harder, but compare only within an industry: a retailer turns its assets over far faster than a steel maker.

Days ratios \[ \text{Inventory turnover} = \frac{\text{COGS}}{\text{Avg inventory}}, \quad \text{Inventory days} = \frac{365}{\text{Inventory turnover}} \] \[ \text{Receivable days (DSO)} = \frac{\text{Avg receivables}}{\text{Sales}} \times 365 \] \[ \text{Payable days} = \frac{\text{Avg payables}}{\text{COGS}} \times 365 \] \[ \text{Cash conversion cycle (CCC)} = \text{Inventory days} + \text{Receivable days} - \text{Payable days} \]
COGS
Cost of goods sold for the year, in ₹ crore. Here COGS = sales × (material cost % + manufacturing cost %) from screener's expense breakdown. Varsity builds COGS from material, purchases, stores and spares, and power and fuel, which is close to the same idea.
Avg inventory
(Inventory at the start of the year + at the end) ÷ 2.
Inventory turnover
How many times a year the stock is sold and replaced, written as "×".
Avg receivables
Average of opening and closing trade receivables: money customers owe.
Avg payables
Average of opening and closing trade payables: money owed to suppliers.
Sales
Revenue from operations for the year.
365
Days in a year. It turns "a fraction of a year" into days.
DSO
Days sales outstanding, another name for receivable days.
  1. Inventory turnover = COGS ÷ average inventory. Then 365 ÷ turnover gives inventory days. (This is the same as average inventory ÷ COGS × 365.)
  2. Receivable days: average receivables as a fraction of a year's sales, times 365. It is roughly how long customers take to pay.
  3. Payable days: the same idea with payables, measured against COGS because suppliers are paid for goods at cost, not at selling price.
  4. CCC: add inventory days and receivable days, then subtract payable days. The answer is in days; the paragraph below explains how to read it.

The logic: money flows round a loop. The company pays suppliers, holds goods (inventory days), sells on credit (receivable days) and finally collects cash. Supplier credit (payable days) funds part of that loop for free. The CCC is the number of days the company's own cash is locked in the loop. A shorter CCC means less capital is needed for each rupee of growth. A negative CCC means suppliers effectively fund the business.

Real example · ASIANPAINT · FY2026

Working-capital ratios step by step

  1. COGS = 35,584 × (49.87% + 8.25%) = 20,681
  2. Average inventory = (5,744 + 6,719) ÷ 2 = 6,231.5. Inventory turnover = 20,681 ÷ 6,231.5 = 3.32×. Inventory days = 365 ÷ 3.32 ≈ 110
  3. Average receivables = (4,462 + 4,314) ÷ 2 = 4,388. Receivable turnover = 35,584 ÷ 4,388 = 8.11×. DSO = 45 days
  4. Average payables = (3,863 + 3,848) ÷ 2 = 3,855.5. Payable days = 3,855.5 ÷ 20,681 × 365 = 68
  5. CCC = 110 + 45 − 68 ≈ 87 days
  6. Fixed-asset turnover = 35,584 ÷ ((11,489 + 10,474) ÷ 2) = 3.24×

Screener shows 118 inventory days and an 84-day CCC for the same year because it uses a slightly different cost base. Neither figure is wrong. Use one source consistently.

CompanyAsset turnoverFixed-asset turnoverInventory daysReceivable daysPayable daysCCC (days)
Paints & adhesives
ASIANPAINT1.10x3.24x110456887
BERGEPAINT1.24x2.99x111488177
KANSAINER0.95x3.19x110647896
PIDILITIND0.99x2.45x87507462
FMCG
HINDUNILVR0.81x1.13x5220139-66
NESTLEIND1.83x3.44x87593≈0
ITC0.87x3.35x1732053140
BRITANNIA2.06x6.51x38953-7
Autos
MARUTI1.31x4.30x251253-16
BAJAJ-AUTO0.96x7.31x351664-12
EICHERMOT0.79x5.47x47770-16
Retail
DMART2.56x3.56x331726
TRENT1.90x4.08x6613234
TITAN1.73x15.63x182412174
Pharma
SUNPHARMA0.58x1.80x26689165190
DRREDDY0.64x1.52x17910469214
CIPLA0.71x2.16x1927295169
Metals & cement
TATASTEEL0.81x1.16x11588043
JSWSTEEL0.73x1.30x88198720
ULTRACEMCO0.64x0.85x82258323
Horizontal stacked bars of inventory days and receivable days, with payable days shown to the left of zero and cash conversion cycle dots, for eleven companies
Cash conversion cycle, FY2026. Hindustan Unilever, Maruti and Britannia are paid by customers before they pay suppliers (negative CCC). Pharma and jewellery tie up cash for six months or more.
Real example · HINDUNILVR vs SUNPHARMA · FY2026

Negative versus very long cash cycles

HUL: inventory 52 days + receivables 20 days − payables 139 days = CCC −66 days. Retailers and distributors pay HUL almost immediately, while HUL takes over four months to pay its own suppliers. When sales grow, HUL's working capital releases cash instead of consuming it. This is one reason FMCG leaders can grow without borrowing.

Sun Pharma: inventory 266 + receivables 89 − payables 165 = CCC ≈ 190 days. Pharma holds months of active ingredients and finished stock for regulated export markets and offers long credit to distributors abroad. That is normal for the industry, so compare Sun with Dr Reddy's (214 days) and Cipla (169 days), not with HUL.

Real example · IT services · FY2026

For service companies, receivable days are what matter

CompanyReceivable days (DSO)Asset turnoverFixed-asset turnoverCFO / PAT
TCS871.57x9.11x1.05x
INFY681.18x5.41x1.15x
HCLTECH801.19x3.53x1.20x
WIPRO500.69x1.90x1.13x

IT firms hold almost no inventory, and their payables are tiny compared with material costs, so the CCC formula breaks down. Watch DSO instead. TCS took about 87 days to collect in FY26. On screener's basis, its debtor days rose from 81 (FY24) to 93 (FY26). Rising DSO in IT can mean clients are paying more slowly or work is being billed later. Investigate it, and do not ignore it.

Varsity's caution on "too good" inventory numbers

A very high inventory turnover looks great. But it can also mean the company cannot produce enough, perhaps because it is short of funds, lacks access to raw materials, or cannot get bank loans. Whenever inventory ratios look unusually good, read the production and capacity section of the annual report to make sure demand is not simply going unmet.

Red flag: sales backed by receivables

If receivable days rise year after year while sales grow, the company may be pushing goods onto distributors on easy credit to show growth. Varsity's checklist lists this as a warning sign. Compare the growth in receivables with the growth in sales. Receivables growing much faster is a problem.

7. Growth ratios: CAGR over 3, 5 and 10 years

Varsity's checklist asks for revenue growth that keeps pace with profit growth, and EPS growth that matches net profit growth (Section 12). Many investors, this course included, also want double-digit growth, with 15% a year or more counted as strong. The standard measure is the Compound Annual Growth Rate: the constant yearly rate that takes you from the starting value to the ending value.

Formula\[ \text{CAGR} = \left(\frac{\text{Ending value}}{\text{Starting value}}\right)^{1/n} - 1 \]
Starting value
The figure (revenue in ₹ crore, or EPS in ₹) in the first year of the window.
Ending value
The same figure in the last year, here FY26.
\(n\)
The number of years between them. FY16 → FY26 is 10 years.
\(^{1/n}\)
Raising to the power \(1/n\) takes the \(n\)th root: it turns a total multiple into a per-year multiple. The power 1/10 is the same as 0.1.

How it works: divide the ending value by the starting value to get the total growth multiple. Take the \(n\)th root to get the one-year multiple, then subtract 1 to get the yearly rate (0.094 = 9.4%). In a spreadsheet: =(End/Start)^(1/n)-1. It only works when both values are positive, so a loss year gives no CAGR (the "–" in the tables).

Real example · TCS revenue · FY2016 → FY2026

One company, three windows

  1. 10-year: (2,67,021 ÷ 1,08,646)1/10 − 1 = (2.458)0.1 − 1 = 9.4%
  2. 5-year: (2,67,021 ÷ 1,64,177)1/5 − 1 = (1.626)0.2 − 1 = 10.2%
  3. 3-year: (2,67,021 ÷ 2,25,458)1/3 − 1 = (1.184)0.333 − 1 = 5.8%

The 3-year number shows a clear slowdown. Global IT spending weakened after the FY22 boom. Long windows show what the business can do over a full cycle, while short windows show the current direction. Always look at both.

Real example · MARUTI EPS · base effect

When a CAGR flatters

Maruti's EPS was ₹145.30 in FY21, which was hit by the COVID lockdown, and ₹466.90 in FY26. The 5-year EPS CAGR = (466.90 ÷ 145.30)0.2 − 1 = 26.3%, which looks spectacular. Over 10 years from FY16 (₹181.98) it is only 9.9%. The 5-year figure starts from an unusually depressed year. Check whether the starting year was abnormal before trusting any CAGR.

CompanyRevenue 3yRevenue 5yRevenue 10yEPS 3yEPS 5yEPS 10y
TCS5.8%10.2%9.4%5.7%9.2%8.2%
INFY6.8%12.2%11.1%7.7%9.8%9.5%
HCLTECH8.7%11.5%–3.9%8.4%–
WIPRO0.8%8.4%6.1%6.8%5.0%6.4%
MARUTI15.7%21.1%12.3%19.5%26.3%9.9%
BAJAJ-AUTO19.9%17.8%10.8%21.5%18.0%10.6%
EICHERMOT17.5%21.8%–23.6%32.5%–
ASIANPAINT1.0%10.4%9.6%1.7%6.6%9.5%
PIDILITIND7.4%14.9%10.5%24.3%16.7%11.9%
DMART17.1%23.3%23.1%7.5%21.8%23.1%
TRENT34.5%50.6%28.1%57.0%–40.1%
TITAN29.2%32.3%22.8%16.0%39.1%22.4%
Two grouped bar charts of revenue and EPS CAGR over 3, 5 and 10 years for eight companies with a 15 percent reference line
Growth windows to FY2026. Very few large companies clear a 15% reference line on every window. A missing bar means the history is not comparable: a loss year, a merger, or a change in financial year.
EPS growth versus PAT growth: the dilution check

If profit grows 17% but EPS grows only 10%, new shares have been issued and existing owners' slices have shrunk. Pidilite's equity capital doubled from ₹51 cr to ₹102 cr between FY21 and FY26. That was a bonus issue, which is not dilution, so its EPS CAGR (16.7%) still matches its PAT CAGR (17.0%). Comparing growth rates, rather than share capital, handles bonuses and splits automatically.

8. Valuation ratios: what you pay for the business

Varsity puts it plainly: a mediocre business at a very cheap price can be a better investment than a great business at an extreme price. Valuation ratios compare the price with what you receive in return: earnings, book value, sales or cash. Full intrinsic-value methods (DCF, reverse DCF) are covered in Chapter 8. Here we cover the quick multiples.

Formulas \[ \text{P/E} = \frac{\text{Price}}{\text{EPS}} = \frac{\text{Market cap}}{\text{Net profit}} \] \[ \text{P/B} = \frac{\text{Price}}{\text{Book value per share}} \qquad \text{P/S} = \frac{\text{Market cap}}{\text{Sales}} \] \[ \text{EV} = \text{Market cap} + \text{Debt} - \text{Cash} \qquad \text{EV/EBITDA} = \frac{\text{EV}}{\text{EBITDA}} \] \[ \text{Dividend yield} = \frac{\text{DPS}}{\text{Price}} \qquad \text{Earnings yield} = \frac{\text{EPS}}{\text{Price}} = \frac{1}{\text{P/E}} \] \[ \text{PEG} = \frac{\text{P/E}}{\text{EPS growth \% p.a.}} \]
Price
The share price in ₹. This chapter uses the close on 30 Sep 2026.
EPS
Earnings per share over the trailing twelve months (TTM: the last four reported quarters), in ₹.
Market cap
Price × number of shares, in ₹ crore: what the market values all the company's shares at.
Net profit
TTM net profit, in ₹ crore.
Book value per share
Shareholders' equity (share capital + reserves) ÷ number of shares, in ₹.
Sales
TTM sales, in ₹ crore.
EV
Enterprise value: roughly what it would cost to buy the whole business. You pay the market cap, take on its debt, and get its cash.
Debt, Cash
Borrowings and cash and equivalents from the latest balance sheet.
EBITDA
TTM operating profit (3.1).
DPS
Dividend per share paid over the last 12 months, in ₹.
EPS growth % p.a.
EPS growth per year, entered as a plain number (9.18, not 0.0918). This chapter uses the 5-year EPS CAGR to FY26.
  1. P/E, P/B, P/S and EV/EBITDA are multiples, written as "×": how many rupees you pay for ₹1 of profit, book value, sales or operating profit. The per-share and whole-company versions give the same answer, because multiplying top and bottom by the number of shares changes nothing.
  2. Lower means cheaper, but only when compared with peers, the company's own history and its quality (8.1).
  3. The two yields turn the price round: the profit or dividend you get for each ₹100 invested, as a %.
  4. PEG divides P/E by the growth rate. Near 1 is often called "fair" for a growing company.
Real example · TCS · 30 Sep 2026

Every valuation ratio from one set of inputs

Inputs: close ₹2,050.60; shares ≈ 361.91 cr (screener market cap ₹7,50,973 cr ÷ ₹2,075); TTM net profit ₹50,055 cr; TTM EPS ₹137.64; equity ₹1,07,240 cr; borrowings ₹11,283 cr; cash ₹12,908 cr; TTM EBITDA ₹74,079 cr; trailing dividend per share ≈ ₹63.91 (screener yield 3.08% × ₹2,075).

  1. Market cap = 361.91 × 2,050.60 = ₹7,42,142 cr
  2. P/E = 7,42,142 ÷ 50,055 = 14.8× (price ÷ TTM EPS = 2,050.60 ÷ 137.64 = 14.9×; the small gap is from rounding and minority interest)
  3. P/B = 7,42,142 ÷ 1,07,240 = 6.9×. A high P/B like this is supported by a 49% ROE.
  4. EV = 7,42,142 + 11,283 − 12,908 = 7,40,517. EV/EBITDA = 7,40,517 ÷ 74,079 = 10.0×
  5. Dividend yield = 63.91 ÷ 2,050.60 = 3.12%. Earnings yield = 1 ÷ 14.83 = 6.7%
  6. PEG (5-year EPS CAGR 9.18%) = 14.83 ÷ 9.18 = 1.62
CompanyPrice 30-Sep-26 (Rs)P/E (TTM)P/BP/SEV/EBITDADiv. yieldEarnings yieldPEG (5y EPS)
IT services
TCS2,050.614.8x6.9x2.7x10.0x3.12%6.7%1.62
INFY994.113.3x4.3x2.2x8.9x4.83%7.5%1.35
HCLTECH1,230.019.2x4.4x2.5x11.5x4.39%5.2%2.29
WIPRO158.511.9x1.8x1.7x9.2x6.92%8.4%2.36
Paints & adhesives
ASIANPAINT2,402.647.4x10.7x6.2x32.1x1.14%2.1%7.17
BERGEPAINT455.543.7x7.7x4.3x28.0x0.87%2.3%4.66
KANSAINER178.024.5x2.1x1.7x14.5x1.41%4.1%11.30
PIDILITIND1,465.155.5x13.7x9.7x39.5x0.79%1.8%3.33
FMCG
HINDUNILVR1,879.129.4x9.0x6.7x28.6x2.18%3.4%2.19
NESTLEIND1,310.066.2x48.9x10.3x44.1x0.92%1.5%–
ITC262.816.2x4.5x4.3x12.7x5.52%6.2%1.79
BRITANNIA4,830.044.8x22.9x6.0x32.7x1.87%2.2%7.07
Autos
MARUTI11,967.026.3x3.5x1.9x17.8x1.17%3.8%1.00
BAJAJ-AUTO10,874.025.9x7.7x4.2x22.5x1.38%3.9%1.44
EICHERMOT7,150.034.0x7.8x7.9x31.9x1.14%2.9%1.05

PEG uses 5-year EPS CAGR to FY26. "–" means a comparable 5-year history is not available. The numbers are a snapshot on 30-Sep-2026 and change every trading day.

8.1 Valuation must be read with quality: the P/E vs ROE map

Scatter of trailing P/E against ROE for 27 companies coloured by sector
Quality against price on 30-Sep-2026. Retail and FMCG leaders trade at roughly 45–81× earnings. IT trades at 12–19× despite ROEs of 16–49%. JSW Steel's 10.9× is an artefact of one-off income (see 8.3).

No single P/E is "cheap" or "expensive". The market pays more for earnings that are (a) growing fast, (b) predictable and (c) earned at high ROE with little reinvestment needed. In September 2026 the market was paying about 77× for Trent's 3-year EPS CAGR of 57%, and only about 15× for TCS's 5.7%. Whether either price is right is the job of Chapter 8.

8.2 Multiples change: de-rating and re-rating

Two panels showing monthly P/E and share price for TCS and Asian Paints from 2016 to 2026
P/E = month-end price ÷ the latest full-year EPS (switching each May when annual results are out). Source: NSE prices via Yahoo Finance; EPS from screener.in.
Real example · TCS · Aug 2021 → Sep 2026

A great business can still be a poor investment at the wrong price

In August 2021 TCS traded at ₹3,786 and about 43× its FY21 EPS of ₹87.67. EPS then rose every single year to ₹136.01 in FY26, a 55% increase. Yet on 30 Sep 2026 the share was at ₹2,050.60, about 15× FY26 EPS. The business improved. The multiple the market was willing to pay collapsed. Paying 43× built in expectations that did not come true. The same thing happened to Asian Paints, whose P/E peaked near 107× in Aug-2022 (on depressed FY22 EPS) and was about 53× by Sep-2026.

8.3 Strip out one-offs before trusting a low P/E

Real example · JSWSTEEL & HINDUNILVR · TTM to Jun-2026

Two "cheap" P/Es that are not what they seem

JSW Steel: TTM other income was ₹18,981 cr against an FY22–FY25 average of ₹1,184 cr. That is an excess of about ₹17,798 cr, which must come from a one-time gain. Reported TTM P/E = 3,06,122 ÷ 27,995 = 10.9×. Removing the excess:

HUL: excess other income ≈ ₹4,223 cr. Reported P/E 29.4× becomes 37–41× after adjustment. Screener's own P/E figures (25.0× and 39.1× on 2 Oct 2026) also strip exceptional items, which is why they differ from a simple market cap ÷ net profit.

Bar chart comparing reported and adjusted P/E for JSW Steel and Hindustan Unilever
Reported against adjusted P/E. The adjusted range depends on how the one-off gain was taxed. Read the exceptional-items note in the results to pin it down.

8.4 Index valuation

Varsity also shows how to value the whole market. NSE publishes the Nifty 50's P/E, P/B and dividend yield every day (on niftyindices.com, under historical data). Varsity's 2014 rule of thumb was to be cautious above about 22× and that the best entry points historically came near 16× or below. Earnings composition and interest rates have changed since then. Treat those numbers as history and compare today's index P/E with its own 10-year range. Chapter 8 covers this in detail.

Valuation mistakes to avoid

9. Banks need their own ratios

A bank's raw material is money. It borrows from depositors and lends to borrowers, so "sales", "inventory" and "debt" mean something different. A bank with D/E of 7 is normal, and the CCC concept does not apply. Varsity's banking chapters list the metrics to use instead. Banks report most of them every quarter in their investor presentations.

Core bank formulas \[ \text{NII} = \text{Interest earned} - \text{Interest expended} \qquad \text{NIM} = \frac{\text{NII}}{\text{Avg interest-earning assets}} \] \[ \text{GNPA ratio} = \frac{\text{Gross NPAs}}{\text{Gross advances}} \qquad \text{Net NPA amount} = \text{Gross NPA amount} - \text{Provisions} \] \[ \text{NNPA ratio} = \frac{\text{Net NPA}}{\text{Net advances}} \qquad \text{PCR} = \frac{\text{Provisions}}{\text{GNPA}} \approx 1 - \frac{\text{NNPA amount}}{\text{GNPA amount}} \] \[ \text{CASA ratio} = \frac{\text{Current + Savings deposits}}{\text{Total deposits}} \qquad \text{CD ratio} = \frac{\text{Advances}}{\text{Deposits}} \] \[ \text{CAR} = \frac{\text{Tier 1} + \text{Tier 2 capital}}{\text{Risk-weighted assets}} \]
Interest earned / expended
Interest the bank receives on loans and investments, and pays on deposits and borrowings, during the year (₹ crore).
NII
Net interest income: the bank's core earnings.
Avg interest-earning assets
Loans, investments and other assets that earn interest, averaged over the period. Some banks quote NIM on total assets instead.
NPA
Non-performing asset: a loan whose interest or principal is more than 90 days overdue.
Gross NPAs
The total amount of NPAs before any provisions, in ₹ crore.
Advances
The bank's loans. "Gross" advances are before provisions; "net" advances are after subtracting provisions.
Provisions
Money the bank has already set aside (charged to its P&L) against expected losses on bad loans.
Net NPA
Gross NPA − provisions: the part of bad loans not yet covered.
PCR
Provision coverage ratio: the share of bad loans already provided for.
CASA deposits
Current + savings deposits: current accounts pay almost no interest and savings accounts pay a little, so this is the cheapest money a bank has.
Tier 1 / Tier 2
Tier 1 is core capital, mainly share capital and reserves (its purest part is CET1). Tier 2 is weaker capital, such as certain bonds and general provisions.
Risk-weighted assets
The bank's loans and other assets, each scaled by an RBI risk weight, so riskier loans count for more.
  1. Earnings: NII and NIM work as in Chapter 6, section 9.1. Higher NIM is better.
  2. Asset quality: the GNPA ratio is the share of loans that have gone bad; the NNPA ratio is what remains after provisions. Lower is better. PCR shows how much of the bad loans is already provided for; higher is more conservative. The "≈" is there because banks' reported PCR can differ from the simple formula (for example, by counting only specific provisions).
  3. Funding: a higher CASA ratio means cheaper deposits. The CD ratio shows how much of each ₹100 of deposits has been lent out.
  4. Safety: CAR (also called CRAR) is capital as a % of risk-weighted assets. It must stay above RBI's minimum (see the list below).

Example (ICICI Bank, Jun-2026, from the source note below the bank table): PCR \(\approx 1 - 5{,}908/23{,}847 = 0.75\), so about 75% of its bad loans were already provided for.

Real example · HDFCBANK · FY2026 standalone

From the annual P&L to bank ratios

  1. Interest earned 3,07,522 − interest expended 1,78,836 = NII ₹1,28,686 cr
  2. Average total assets = (43,64,886 + 39,10,199) ÷ 2 = 41,37,542.5. NII ÷ average assets = 3.11%. This is a proxy for NIM. The bank's reported NIM for Q1 FY27 was 3.26%, which its presentation states is on total assets (the same base as ours). On interest-earning assets only it was about 3.4%. Our full-year figure differs because the bank averages balances through the period, while we only average two year-end totals.
  3. ROA = PAT 74,671 ÷ 41,37,542.5 = 1.80% (the bank reported 1.85% for Q1 FY27, annualised)
  4. ROE = 74,671 ÷ ((5,62,901 + 5,01,424) ÷ 2) = 14.0%. Leverage ≈ 7.8× assets per rupee of equity.
  5. P/B on 30-Sep-2026 = market cap 10,91,479 ÷ net worth 5,62,901 = 1.94×
  6. CD ratio (Jun-26) = net advances 30,373 bn ÷ deposits 31,708 bn = 95.8%. This is high. It is a legacy of the 2023 merger with HDFC Ltd, whose loans came without deposits, and it also explains HDFC Bank's lower CASA ratio of 32%.
Real example · Five large banks · FY2026 and Q1 FY27 (Jun-2026)

Annual returns and valuation

BankNII FY26 (Rs cr)NII / avg assetsROAROEAssets/EquityBook value/share (Rs)P/E (TTM)P/B
HDFCBANK128,6863.11%1.80%14.0%7.8x36514.4x1.94x
ICICIBANK88,0753.92%2.23%15.9%7.1x47018.2x2.81x
KOTAKBANK30,0104.06%1.90%11.1%5.8x13627.9x3.06x
AXISBANK56,0483.21%1.40%12.7%9.1x66014.8x1.86x
SBIN173,1202.42%1.12%16.2%14.5x59010.8x1.62x

Quarterly bank metrics (as reported for the quarter ended 30-Jun-2026)

BankNIMGross NPANet NPAPCRCASACAR (CRAR)CET1Advances/Deposits
HDFCBANK3.26%1.17%0.40%~66% (specific)32.0%19.60%17.40%95.8%
ICICIBANK4.36%1.38%0.35%~75% (computed)38.1%16.84%16.19%89.0%
KOTAKBANK4.53%1.18%0.27%78%40.3%22.80%22.40%89.4%
AXISBANK3.46%1.28%0.39%70%38.0%16.67%14.64%91.9%
SBIN2.86%1.47%0.38%74.2%39.2%15.67%12.89%84.0%

Sources: HDFC Bank Q1 FY27 investor presentation; ICICI Bank performance review and Q1 FY27 results coverage; Kotak, Axis and SBI Q1 FY27 press releases. ICICI's PCR is computed as 1 − NNPA ÷ GNPA amounts (1 − 5,908 ÷ 23,847 ≈ 75%). For SBI the same calculation (1 − 19,158 ÷ 74,272 = 74.2%) matches the bank's reported 74.20%. HDFC's ~66% is its specific PCR read from the deck. SBI's CD ratio uses gross advances.

Six small bar charts comparing NIM, ROA, ROE, gross NPA, CASA and price to book across HDFC, ICICI, Kotak, Axis and SBI
Bank peer dashboard. ICICI combines a high NIM with the highest ROA, and the market pays 2.8× book. SBI has the lowest NIM and ROA but high leverage, which lifts its ROE to 16%, and it trades at the lowest P/B.
Reading the bank table

Kotak's standalone P/E of about 28× looks out of line with its 11% standalone ROE. The standalone figures exclude its valuable subsidiaries (securities, asset management, insurance), which the share price includes. For banks with large subsidiaries, use consolidated numbers or value the parts separately. This "sum of the parts" idea is covered in Chapter 8.

10. Piotroski F-score: a nine-point health check

Accounting professor Joseph Piotroski (2000) designed nine simple yes/no tests to find which cheap (low price-to-book) stocks were genuinely improving. Each test scores 1 or 0, giving a total from 0 to 9. In his study, high scorers (8–9) went on to beat low scorers (0–1). The score measures improvement in health, not absolute quality. That is why it suits value and turnaround situations.

GroupTest (score 1 if true)What it captures
Profitability1. ROA > 0   2. CFO > 0   3. ROA higher than last year   4. CFO > net incomeIs it profitable, is the profit backed by cash, and is it improving? Test 4 penalises profits made of accruals rather than cash.
Leverage & liquidity5. Long-term debt/assets fell   6. Current ratio rose   7. No new equity issuedIs the balance sheet getting stronger without raising money from shareholders?
Efficiency8. Gross margin rose   9. Asset turnover roseIs the business itself running better?

Implementation notes: ROA = net income ÷ beginning total assets, as in Piotroski's paper. Screener does not split current assets and liabilities, so our current ratio is a proxy: (inventories + receivables + cash + loans and advances + other asset items) ÷ (trade payables + customer advances + other liability items + short-term borrowings). The share-issuance test uses equity share capital, which rises when new shares are issued at an unchanged face value. Bonus issues also raise share capital, so check the reason if it moves.

Real example · ASIANPAINT · FY2025 → FY2026

F-score for a high-quality company that had a soft patch

TestWorking (FY25 → FY26, Rs cr)Point
1. ROA > 0NI/TA(beg) = 4,395/30,355 = 14.5%1 ✓
2. CFO > 0CFO = 7,0881 ✓
3. ROA improved12.4% -> 14.5%1 ✓
4. Accruals: CFO > NI7,088 vs 4,3951 ✓
5. Leverage (LT debt/TA) fell5.56% -> 8.35%0 ✗
6. Current ratio improved1.76 -> 1.660 ✗
7. No new shares issuedEquity capital Rs 96 cr -> Rs 96 cr1 ✓
8. Gross margin improved40.6% -> 41.9%1 ✓
9. Asset turnover improved1.134 -> 1.1721 ✓
F-score7 / 9

Asian Paints scores 7. Profitability improved after the weak FY25, but it lost points because long-term borrowings and leases rose (test 5) and the proxy current ratio slipped (test 6).

Real example · TATASTEEL · FY2025 → FY2026

F-score for a cyclical recovery

TestWorking (FY25 → FY26, Rs cr)Point
1. ROA > 0NI/TA(beg) = 10,886/275,459 = 4.0%1 ✓
2. CFO > 0CFO = 35,0641 ✓
3. ROA improved1.2% -> 4.0%1 ✓
4. Accruals: CFO > NI35,064 vs 10,8861 ✓
5. Leverage (LT debt/TA) fell27.01% -> 24.01%1 ✓
6. Current ratio improved0.70 -> 0.670 ✗
7. No new shares issuedEquity capital Rs 1,247 cr -> Rs 1,247 cr1 ✓
8. Gross margin improved32.8% -> 37.4%1 ✓
9. Asset turnover improved0.811 -> 0.8431 ✓
F-score8 / 9

Tata Steel scores 8 even though its ROE (11%) is half of Asian Paints'. That is exactly what Piotroski designed the score to do: catch a low-return, heavily indebted company whose direction has turned. ROA tripled, cash flow was three times profit, debt fell and margins expanded. Use the F-score as a turnaround detector inside value screens, not as a quality ranking. A cyclical company can score 8 at the top of its cycle, just before things turn down.

11. Qualitative analysis: business, moat, management, promoters

Numbers tell you what happened. Qualitative analysis tells you why and whether it is likely to continue. Varsity's equity research begins with understanding the business, before any ratio, because "the more you know the company, the higher is your conviction to stay put" when prices fall in a bear market.

11.1 Where stock ideas come from

Varsity lists six sources: general observation (what people around you are buying), stock screeners (for example ROE > 20% and PAT margin > 15%), macro trends (an infrastructure push helps cement), sectoral trends (a shift in what consumers prefer), special situations (a new board member, a demerger, a restructuring) and your circle of competence (a doctor understands healthcare better than most analysts do). Keep a watch-list. A company that fails your checklist today may pass in two years.

11.2 Business model: how does the company make money?

Before any ratio, write down in one paragraph: what it sells, to whom, why customers choose it, what the main costs are, and what could break the model. If you cannot fit that on one page, you do not yet understand the business. Varsity says the author does exactly this after about 15 hours of reading.

11.3 Moats: why competitors cannot easily copy the profits

Warren Buffett popularised the term "economic moat". It means a durable advantage that protects profits from competitors. Sustained ROCE well above the cost of capital is the numerical evidence of a moat. The moat itself is one of these:

Moat typeHow it worksIndian examples (illustrative)Ratio fingerprint
Brand / intangibleCustomers pay more or choose by defaultAsian Paints, Nestlé (Maggi), Royal Enfield (Eicher), Titan (Tanishq)High gross & EBITDA margin, stable through cycles
Distribution / networkReach that takes decades to replicate; value rises with more usersHUL and ITC's retail reach; CDSL; exchange and depository networksNegative CCC, high asset turnover, high ROCE
Switching costsChanging supplier is costly or risky for the customerIT services on multi-year contracts; core banking software; bank salary accountsStable revenue, high client retention, steady margins
Cost advantage / scaleLowest-cost producer survives price warsDMart's everyday low cost; UltraTech's scale in cementThin but stable margin with very high asset turnover; best margin in a commodity industry
Licence / regulationLegal barriers keep competitors outCigarettes, liquor, stock exchanges, defenceVery high margins, few competitors

Moats erode. Varsity's own PVR example notes that the thesis had to be re-checked once new players entered. Paints shows the same thing here: margins and ROE slipped after FY24 as large new entrants arrived. Re-test every moat once a year.

11.4 Management quality and corporate governance

11.5 Promoter holding and pledging

Stacked horizontal bars showing promoter, FII, DII, government and public shareholding for eleven companies
Shareholding pattern, latest quarter on screener (Jun-2026). Promoter stakes range from about 75% (DMart) to zero (ITC, a professionally managed company with no promoter group).

11.6 Capital allocation: what management does with the cash

A company that earns 25% ROCE but reinvests in projects earning 8% destroys value. Look at the last 5–10 years of cash flow statements:

12. Varsity's three-stage research process, turned into a checklist

Varsity organises equity research for retail investors with "limited resources" (annual report, internet, spreadsheet) into three stages. Do not skip any of them.

  1. Stage 1 · Understand the business. Read at least five years of annual reports and answer questions such as: What does the company do? Who are the promoters? Where are the plants, and are they running at full capacity? What raw materials does it use, and are they regulated or imported? Who are the customers and competitors? What is the revenue mix? How heavy is regulation? What are the entry barriers? Could cheap-labour countries replicate the product? How many subsidiaries are there? Who are the auditors and bankers? If you find a red flag here, stop. Do not go on to Stage 2, however good the numbers look.
  2. Stage 2 · Apply the financial checklist. Varsity's list includes gross margin > 20%, revenue growth in line with profit growth, EPS consistent with net profit, low debt, a sensible inventory trend, sales not driven by receivables, positive operating cash flow, ROE > 25% (checked together with debt; in the ratio chapters the author says he personally prefers 18% or more), one or two simple business lines, and not too many subsidiaries.
  3. Stage 3 · Valuation. Even a company that passes every check is a poor investment at the wrong price. Varsity uses DCF with a ±10% intrinsic-value band. See Chapter 8.

12.1 Our adapted Stage-2 checklist with thresholds

#CheckThreshold (starting point)Why
1Gross margin> 20% (non-financial, non-services)Pricing power; evidence of a moat
2Revenue CAGR (5y and 10y)> 10% (15%+ is strong)Business is growing across cycles
3PAT CAGR vs revenue CAGRPAT growth within ~3 points of revenue growth or betterMargins are not being sacrificed for growth
4EPS CAGR vs PAT CAGRWithin ~1 pointNo dilution of existing shareholders
5Debt/Equity< 0.5 (higher only for utilities or financiers)Survives a bad year
6Interest coverage> 5×Interest is comfortably serviced
7Inventory days trendStable or fallingProducts are moving and not piling up
8Receivables ÷ sales trendNot risingSales are not pushed through on credit
9Cumulative 5y CFO ÷ PAT> 0.8Profits turn into cash
10ROE (and 5y average)> 15% (Varsity checklist: > 25%; ratio chapter: 18%+) with D/E checkEarns well above its cost of equity
11Promoter holdingStable; pledge zero or explainedOwners are not exiting or under stress
12Business lines / subsidiaries1–2 focused segments; subsidiaries explainedFocus; lower risk of money leaking out
Real example · Stage 2 applied · FY2026 data

Five companies through the checklist

Check (FY2026 unless noted)PIDILITINDASIANPAINTKANSAINERTCSTATASTEEL
Gross margin > 20%51% ✓42% ✓34% ✓n.a. (services)37% ✓
Revenue CAGR 5y > 10%14.9% ✓10.4% ✓9.7% ✗10.2% ✓8.2% ✗
PAT CAGR 5y ≈ revenue CAGR (no margin collapse)17.0% ✓6.5% ✗1.8% ✗8.7% ✓5.9% ✓
EPS CAGR ≈ PAT CAGR (no dilution)16.7% ✓6.6% ✓2.2% ✓9.2% ✓6.7% ✓
Debt/Equity < 0.50.04 ✓0.18 ✓0.05 ✓0.11 ✓0.90 ✗
Interest cover > 5x57.9x ✓28.1x ✓23.3x ✓54.5x ✓3.1x ✗
Inventory days stable/falling (FY23→FY26)98→98 ✓121→118 ✓134→119 ✓n.a.175→184 ✗
Receivables/Sales not rising (FY23→FY26)13%→15% ✗13%→13% ✓16%→18% ✗22%→25% ✗3%→2% ✓
5y cumulative CFO / PAT > 0.81.18x ✓1.09x ✓0.79x ✗1.01x ✓2.45x ✓
ROE FY26 > 15% (5y avg in brackets)24% (22%) ✓22% (25%) ✓9% (10%) ✗49% (49%) ✓11% (14%) ✗
Promoter stake stable (1y)69.3→69.2% ✓52.6→52.6% ✓75.0→75.0% ✓71.8→71.8% ✓33.2→32.9% ✓
Passes10/1110/116/118/96/11
P/E at 30-Sep-26 (for Stage 3)55.5x47.4x24.5x14.8x20.4x

How to read it: Pidilite and Asian Paints pass most financial checks. Their P/Es of 55× and 47× mean Stage 3 (valuation) will decide whether the price is acceptable. Kansai Nerolac is cheaper at 24× but fails on growth, ROE and cash conversion, which looks like a value trap unless something changes. Tata Steel fails on leverage and ROE, but its Piotroski score (Section 10) says the direction is improving. That suits a cyclical position with a defined exit, not a buy-and-forget holding. TCS passes almost everything and is the cheapest on P/E, but its 3-year growth has slowed sharply. This mix of good quality, low growth and low multiple needs a Stage-3 view on whether the growth will come back.

In your framework

The course framework implements this chapter as code. framework.data.fetch_fundamentals(symbol) pulls the screener tables. framework.fundamentals.ratios(fin), dupont(fin) and piotroski_fscore(fin) compute what you did by hand here, and quality_scorecard(symbol) applies a checklist like the one above. From the command line, python -m framework.invest ASIANPAINT prints the scorecard. Use it as a first filter. It cannot do Stage 1 for you.

13. Sector analysis: what to measure in each industry

Varsity's Sector Analysis module starts from a simple point: no two sectors can be analysed the same way. Banks are judged on NPAs and capital, airlines on revenue per seat-kilometre, cement on capacity and cost per tonne. General ratios tell you how a company performs. Sector KPIs tell you why, and how it compares with its real competitors.

13.1 Tools for any sector

Real example · Sector medians · FY2026

Why you compare within sectors

Sector (companies in sample)EBITDA marginROEROCED/EAsset turnoverCCC daysP/E
IT services (TCS, INFY, HCLTECH, WIPRO)22.1%27.1%34.3%0.101.18xn.m.14.1x
Paints & adhesives (ASIANPAINT, BERGEPAINT, KANSAINER, PIDILITIND)17.1%19.4%23.9%0.071.05x8245.6x
FMCG (HINDUNILVR, NESTLEIND, ITC, BRITANNIA)23.0%42.2%47.5%0.061.35x-437.1x
Autos (MARUTI, BAJAJ-AUTO, EICHERMOT)20.8%23.8%28.5%0.020.96x-1626.3x
Cement (ULTRACEMCO, SHREECEM, AMBUJACEM)19.2%10.0%10.5%0.080.64x3037.6x
Metals (TATASTEEL, JSWSTEEL, HINDALCO)14.8%11.3%12.2%0.900.81x4312.9x
Pharma (SUNPHARMA, DRREDDY, CIPLA)20.9%11.8%15.8%0.060.64x19032.3x
Retail (DMART, TRENT, TITAN)9.5%27.7%20.3%0.371.90x3477.0x

The medians differ hugely: cement's median ROE is 10% and FMCG's is 42%; retail's median asset turnover is 1.90× and cement's is 0.64×; metals' median D/E is 0.90 and the other sectors' are near zero. An "average" ROE threshold applied to every sector would reject all cement companies and accept every FMCG company, whatever their price. Set thresholds within sectors.

13.2 Sector KPI guide

SectorKey metrics (Varsity + standard practice)Real numbers from our dataTypical red flags
BanksNII, NIM, CASA, GNPA/NNPA, PCR, CAR/CET1, CD ratio, credit cost, cost-to-income, ROA; loan mix (retail against corporate), digital reach, liquidity (CRR/SLR, LCR = liquidity coverage ratio)Q1 FY27 NIM 2.86% (SBI) to 4.53% (Kotak); GNPA 1.17–1.47%; HDFC core cost-to-income 39.2%Rising slippages, falling PCR, CAR near the regulatory minimum, loan growth far above deposit growth
IT servicesRevenue growth in constant currency (CC), order book / deal wins (TCV), unbilled and unearned revenue, new clients, client concentration, attrition, utilisation, EBIT margin, DSO, USD-INRDSO 50 (Wipro) to 87 days (TCS); employee cost 53–60% of sales; 3y revenue CAGR 0.8–8.7%Shrinking deal wins, rising DSO, top-client concentration, margin fall from wage inflation
FMCG*Volume growth against price growth, gross margin (commodity costs such as palm oil and crude derivatives), advertising spend % of sales, distribution reach, rural/urban mix, working capitalHUL CCC −66 days; gross margin ~50% (HUL, Nestlé, ITC); FMCG median P/E 37×Growth driven only by price hikes, falling volumes, cuts to ad spend to protect margin
AutosProduction and sales volumes (monthly), revenue growth against volume growth (realisation per vehicle), product mix (premium share), market share, capacity utilisation, inventory at dealers, EV readiness, commodity and component costsMaruti material cost 72% of sales; autos median CCC −16 days; Bajaj 3y revenue CAGR 19.9%Dealer stock building up, volume falls hidden by price hikes, rising discounts
CementCapacity (MTPA, million tonnes per annum), capacity utilisation, sales volume, realisation ₹/tonne, EBITDA/tonne, input + power & fuel + freight cost as % of revenue, regional presence and market shareSee cost-mix table below: manufacturing (incl. power & fuel) 29–33% of sales; asset turnover 0.48–0.70×Utilisation falling after big capacity additions; fuel cost spikes; price wars in a region
Metals / steelCapacity, production, sales volume, EBITDA/tonne, captive iron ore and coal (backward integration), input/power/freight cost ratios, D/E and net debt/EBITDA, global steel pricesTata Steel D/E 0.90; JSW Steel interest cover 2.2×; metals median P/E 12.9× (cyclical)Debt-funded expansion at the cycle peak; EBITDA/tonne collapse; low P/E at peak earnings
Pharma*R&D % of sales, US generics pipeline (ANDA filings and approvals), USFDA inspection outcomes (warning letters, import alerts), India branded growth, price controls (NPPA/DPCO), specialty mix, working capitalPharma median CCC 190 days; Sun EBITDA margin 28.2%; employee cost ~18–20% of salesWarning letters at key plants, price erosion in the US, receivables piling up
RetailStore count and area, revenue per sq ft, EBITDA per sq ft, same-store (like-for-like) sales growth, footfall, conversion rate, average bill value, inventory turnover, private-label share, SKUsDMart revenue/sq ft ≈ ₹35,400 (computed below); asset turnover 2.56×; CCC 26 daysSame-store growth turning negative, store expansion funded by debt, falling revenue per sq ft
InsuranceLife: solvency ratio (IRDAI minimum 150%), VNB (value of new business) and margin, persistency (13th/61st month), claims settlement, AUM. General: combined ratio = loss ratio + expense ratio (< 100% means an underwriting profit)(not in our sample)Falling persistency, combined ratio rising above 100%, solvency near the minimum
HotelsKeys, occupancy, ADR (room revenue ÷ rooms sold), RevPAR (room revenue ÷ rooms available), food and other revenue share, EBITDA across ownership models(not in our sample)Occupancy rising only through discounting (falling ADR)
Real estatePre-sales (bookings) volume and value, average realisation ₹/sq ft, collections, land bank, net debt; commercial: rental annuity, occupancy, leasing volume; SOTP valuation(not in our sample)Collections far below pre-sales, rising debt, stalled projects

*Varsity's Sector Analysis module covers cement, insurance, IT, automobiles, banking, steel, hotels, retail and real estate. The FMCG and pharma rows are standard industry practice added for this course, not taken from Varsity.

Real example · Cost structure · FY2026

Varsity's cement and steel "cost ratio" check, using screener's expense breakdown

CompanyMaterial costManufacturing (incl. power & fuel)Employee costOther (incl. freight, ads, royalty)EBITDA margin
ULTRACEMCO19.42%29.10%4.72%27.55%19.2%
SHREECEM10.31%33.29%6.22%28.04%22.1%
AMBUJACEM16.58%33.02%3.94%30.28%16.2%
TATASTEEL40.33%22.32%11.20%11.35%14.8%
JSWSTEEL52%24%3%6%15.9%
TCS0%2%58%13%27.1%
INFY0%19%53%5%23.7%
HINDUNILVR44.56%5.79%4.92%21.40%23.3%
MARUTI72%2%5%9%11.7%
SUNPHARMA19.75%5.78%19.53%26.72%28.2%
DMART85%4%2%2%7.5%

For cement, Varsity separates input cost, power and fuel, and freight. Screener puts power and fuel inside "manufacturing" and freight inside "other". The pattern is still clear: cement is an energy and logistics business, with manufacturing plus other costs above 55% of sales, while Maruti and DMart are purchased-material businesses (72% and 85%). For finer splits, such as freight per tonne, use the company's quarterly investor presentation, as Varsity suggests.

Real example · DMART · FY2026 retail KPIs

Revenue per square foot

Avenue Supermarts reported (standalone, as summarised in its FY26 results coverage) revenue of ₹66,968 cr, 500 stores, and retail area that grew from 17.2 mn sq ft (Mar-25) to 20.6 mn sq ft (Mar-26).

  1. Average area = (17.2 + 20.6) ÷ 2 = 18.9 mn sq ft
  2. Revenue per sq ft = ₹66,968 cr ÷ 18.9 mn sq ft = ₹6,69,68,00,00,000 ÷ 1,89,00,000 ≈ ₹35,400 per sq ft per year
  3. The company's own figure is ₹33,422, against ₹33,896 the year before. It weights area by how long each store was open, and 58 of the 85 new stores opened only in Q4.

Lesson: a fast-expanding retailer's revenue per sq ft can dip simply because new stores are still ramping up. Same-store (like-for-like) growth, reported at 8.1% for mature stores, separates expansion from the health of existing stores.

14. An honest check: did quality pay off?

It is tempting to think that buying high-ROE companies guarantees good returns. Our data says otherwise, at least over 2021–2026.

Scatter of five-year average ROE against five-year share price CAGR for 26 companies
Five-year average ROE against five-year share price CAGR (both from screener.in, 2 Oct 2026; price change excludes dividends). There is essentially no relationship: correlation −0.03.
The lesson

Returns come from what happens relative to expectations, and the starting valuation sets those expectations. Quality ratios reduce the risk of permanent loss. They do not guarantee good returns if you overpay. That is why Stage 3 (valuation, Chapter 8) exists, and why many investors combine fundamentals with a technical trend filter (Chapter 5) to avoid buying good companies while they are still falling.

15. Try it yourself (Python)

These snippets need a copy of the course repository and Python with pandas and numpy (setup steps are in its framework/README.md). Run them from the repository's root folder, for example with .venv/bin/python, because the file paths are relative to that folder. They use the cached screener pages and helper functions in course/scripts/ch07_data.py.

(a) ROE, ROCE and DuPont for any cached company

import sys
sys.path.insert(0, "course/scripts")
import ch07_data as D

m = D.company_metrics("PIDILITIND")
print(f"EBITDA margin {m['ebitda_margin']:.1%}  ROE {m['roe']:.1%}  ROCE {m['roce']:.1%}")
print(f"DuPont: {m['net_margin']:.2%} x {m['asset_turnover']:.2f} x {m['equity_multiplier']:.2f} = {m['dupont_roe']:.1%}")
print(f"D/E {m['de']:.2f}  interest cover {m['icr']:.1f}x  CCC {m['ccc']:.0f} days")

(b) A CAGR function and a growth table straight from the P&L

import sys
sys.path.insert(0, "course/scripts")
import ch07_data as D

def cagr(start, end, years):
    return (end / start) ** (1 / years) - 1

pl = D.table("BAJAJ-AUTO", "profit-loss")
for n in (3, 5, 10):
    s, e = pl.loc["Sales", f"Mar {2026 - n}"], pl.loc["Sales", "Mar 2026"]
    print(f"{n}y revenue CAGR: {cagr(s, e, n):.1%}")

(c) Your own peer screen from the computed metrics file

import pandas as pd
m = pd.read_csv("data/extra/ch07_company_metrics.csv", index_col=0)
screen = m[(m.roe > 0.15) & (m.de < 0.5) & (m.cfo_pat > 0.8) & (m.rev_cagr5 > 0.10)]
print(screen[["sector", "roe", "de", "rev_cagr5", "pe"]].sort_values("pe").round(3))

(d) Rolling P/E from price history and annual EPS

import sys
sys.path.insert(0, "course/scripts")
import pandas as pd, ch07_data as D

px = pd.read_csv("data/ohlc/INFY.csv", index_col=0, parse_dates=True)["Close"].resample("ME").last()
pl = D.table("INFY", "profit-loss")
eps = {int(c[-4:]): pl.loc["EPS in Rs", c] for c in pl.columns if c.startswith("Mar 20")}
pe = pd.Series({d: p / eps.get(d.year if d.month >= 5 else d.year - 1, float("nan")) for d, p in px.items()})
print(pe.loc["2021":].resample("YE").last().round(1))

Exercise: change the thresholds in (c) to sector-specific ones (for example ROE > 10% for cement) and see how the list changes. To refresh the data, re-download a page with curl -A "Mozilla/5.0" https://www.screener.in/company/SYMBOL/consolidated/ into data/extra/screener_ch07/SYMBOL.html.

16. Practical checklist

17. Key takeaways

Key takeaways

18. Quiz and exercises

Q1. A company has sales ₹10,000 cr, total expenses ₹8,600 cr (including ₹200 cr finance cost and ₹400 cr depreciation) and other income ₹300 cr. What is its EBITDA margin?
Operating revenue = 10,000 (other income is excluded). Operating expenses = 8,600 − 200 − 400 = 8,000. EBITDA = 10,000 − 8,000 = 2,000. Margin = 2,000 ÷ 10,000 = 20%. The ₹300 cr of other income is left out because it is not the core business.
Q2. Company A: net margin 5%, asset turnover 3.0×, equity multiplier 1.2×. Company B: net margin 15%, asset turnover 0.8×, equity multiplier 2.5×. Compute both ROEs. Which ROE is riskier and why?
A: 0.05 × 3.0 × 1.2 = 18%. B: 0.15 × 0.8 × 2.5 = 30%. B's higher ROE depends on 2.5× leverage. If its margin halves in a downturn, ROE falls to 15%, and its lenders still have to be paid. A resembles DMart (thin margin, fast turnover, little debt). B's return is higher but carries more balance-sheet risk.
Q3. Using the FY2026 numbers in Section 5, what would Tata Steel's debt/EBITDA have been if EBITDA fell back to its FY24 level of ₹22,248 cr with the same debt?
92,382 ÷ 22,248 = 4.15×, against 2.69× at FY26 EBITDA. That is above the roughly 3× level where lenders become cautious. This is why cyclical companies are stress-tested on bad-year EBITDA.
Q4. A distributor has inventory days 40, receivable days 55 and payable days 30. What is its cash conversion cycle? If sales are ₹365 cr a year (₹1 cr a day), roughly how much working capital is tied up?
CCC = 40 + 55 − 30 = 65 days. At about ₹1 cr of sales a day, that ties up roughly 65 × ₹1 cr ≈ ₹65 cr. This is approximate, because inventory and payables are really valued at cost, not at sales value. Cutting receivable days by 15 would release about ₹15 cr of cash.
Q5. Maruti's EPS was ₹181.98 (FY16), ₹145.30 (FY21) and ₹466.90 (FY26). Compute the 5-year and 10-year EPS CAGR. Which is a better guide to sustainable growth?
5y: (466.90 ÷ 145.30)0.2 − 1 = (3.213)0.2 − 1 = 26.3%. 10y: (466.90 ÷ 181.98)0.1 − 1 = (2.566)0.1 − 1 = 9.9%. FY21 was a COVID-depressed base, so the 5-year number exaggerates. The 10-year rate, plus a check on recent years (3y = 19.5% from FY23's ₹273.56), gives a more balanced picture.
Q6. A stock trades at ₹500. EPS is ₹25, of which ₹8 comes from a one-time land sale (after tax). Book value per share is ₹125. Compute reported P/E, adjusted P/E, P/B and earnings yield on adjusted EPS.
Reported P/E = 500 ÷ 25 = 20×. Adjusted EPS = 25 − 8 = 17, so adjusted P/E = 500 ÷ 17 = 29.4×. P/B = 500 ÷ 125 = 4×. Adjusted earnings yield = 17 ÷ 500 = 3.4%. The "cheap" 20× was an illusion created by the one-off gain, the same trap shown for JSW Steel in Section 8.3.
Q7. A bank has gross NPAs ₹2,000 cr on gross advances ₹1,00,000 cr, and has provided ₹1,400 cr. Compute the GNPA ratio, net NPA amount, and PCR. What happens to profit if regulators make it raise PCR to 80%?
GNPA = 2,000 ÷ 1,00,000 = 2.0%. NNPA = 2,000 − 1,400 = ₹600 cr (about 0.6% of net advances). PCR = 1,400 ÷ 2,000 = 70%. Raising PCR to 80% needs provisions of ₹1,600 cr, which is an extra ₹200 cr charged to the P&L, so pre-tax profit falls by ₹200 cr. That is why a high PCR signals conservatism: profit has already absorbed those charges.
Q8. Why can Tata Steel score 8/9 on Piotroski in FY26 while Asian Paints scores 7/9, even though Asian Paints has twice the ROE? Does this make Tata Steel the "better" company?
Piotroski scores changes: ROA rising, debt falling, margins and turnover rising, cash exceeding profit. Tata Steel was recovering from a weak FY25 (ROA 1.2% → 4.0%, debt down, gross margin 32.8% → 37.4%). Asian Paints' level is higher, but it lost points for rising long-term debt and leases and a lower current ratio. A higher F-score means improving fundamentals, not a better business. It is most useful for screening cheap or turnaround stocks.
Q9. Which sector KPIs would you check first for (a) a cement company, (b) an IT services company, (c) a retailer?
(a) Cement: capacity and utilisation, sales volume, realisation ₹/tonne, EBITDA/tonne, power and fuel plus freight cost ratios, regional market share. (b) IT: constant-currency revenue growth, deal wins / order book, client additions and concentration, attrition, EBIT margin, DSO. (c) Retail: store count and area, revenue per sq ft, EBITDA per sq ft, same-store sales growth, footfall and conversion, average bill value, inventory turnover.
Q10. Exercise: Using the Try-it code (a), compute ROE, DuPont and CCC for BRITANNIA and NESTLEIND. Why are both ROEs above 50%? Is that good, and what should you check?
From our data: Britannia ROE ≈ 53.6% (net margin 13.2% × asset turnover 2.06× × equity multiplier 1.96×) and Nestlé ≈ 76.3% (15.1% × 1.83× × 2.77×). Both have fast asset turnover and a small equity base, because they pay out most of their profit as dividends. Britannia also has some debt. The returns are genuine and reflect strong brands, but a small equity base inflates ROE. Check ROCE (56% and 88%, also very high), cash conversion (CFO/PAT 1.03× and 1.44×) and growth: 3-year revenue CAGR is only 5.5% for Britannia. With P/Es of about 45× and 66×, high quality is already in the price.

19. Sources

Zerodha Varsity, Module 3 – Fundamental Analysis: Financial Ratio Analysis (profitability, DuPont) · Financial Ratios Part 2 (leverage & operating) · Financial Ratios Part 3 (valuation & index valuation) · Investment Due Diligence (stock ideas, moat, checklist) · Equity Research Part 1 (Stage 1 questions, Stage 2 checklist) · Equity Research Part 2 (Stage 3, DCF – used in Ch 8).
Zerodha Varsity – Sector Analysis: Overview · Cement · Insurance 1 · Insurance 2 · Information Technology · Automobiles 1 · Automobiles 2 · Banking 1 · Banking 2 · Steel 1 · Steel 2 · Hotels 1 · Hotels 2 · Retail 1 · Retail 2 · Real Estate 1 · Real Estate 2.
Data: Company financials and shareholding: screener.in consolidated pages (standalone for banks), fetched 2 Oct 2026 and cached in data/extra/screener_ch07/. Prices: NSE daily closes via Yahoo Finance (data/ohlc/; extra peers in data/extra/ch07_extra_closes_yf.csv), close of 30 Sep 2026. Computed metrics: data/extra/ch07_company_metrics.csv, data/extra/ch07_bank_metrics.csv. Scripts: course/scripts/ch07_data.py, ch07_figures.py, ch07_tables.py.
Bank Q1 FY27 metrics (quarter ended 30 Jun 2026): HDFC Bank Q1 FY2027 investor presentation (data/extra/HDFCBANK_Q1FY27_earnings_presentation.pdf); ICICI Bank performance review, Q1 FY27 and DSIJ results summary; Kotak Mahindra Bank Q1 FY27 press release; Axis Bank Q1 FY27 press release (18 Jul 2026); SBI Q1 FY27 press release (7 Aug 2026).
Regulation: RBI Basel III capital regulations (minimum CRAR 9%, CET1 5.5%, Tier 1 7%, CCB 2.5%) — RBI master circulars; policy rates (repo 5.25%, CRR 3%, SLR 18% after the Aug 2026 MPC) — rbi.org.in, as summarised by ClearTax (verify after the 5–7 Oct 2026 MPC). Promoter encumbrance disclosure — SEBI (SAST) Regulations 2011, Reg. 31 (sebi.gov.in; explainer: Vinod Kothari); NSE pledged data.
Other: DMart FY26 retail metrics as summarised by scanx.trade (check the company's investor presentation for the original). Piotroski, J. (2000), "Value Investing: The Use of Historical Financial Statement Information to Separate Winners from Losers", Journal of Accounting Research 38 (Supplement).

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